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Article
Liability of Secondary Actors under the Alien
Tort Statute: Aiding and Abetting and
Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the
Femicides of Ciudad Jua'rez
William Paul Simmons'
Since 1993, more than 400 women have been murdered in Ciudad Judrez,
Mexico. Few, if any of these crimes have been solved, largely because local
Mexican officials have failed to adequately investigate them. This Article
argues that femicide victims could hold those officials civilly liable as third
parties for these femicides in U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS). Although aiding and abetting liability is the most common
form of third-party liability sought in ATS cases, several high profile
cases have challenged whether it should exist under the ATS. The author
agrees with many courts and scholars that aiding and abetting liability
should be sustained. However, the author argues that none of the
previously proposed standards for aiding and abetting would reach the
Mexican officials. Instead, the author proposes "acquiescence to torture"
as an innovative form of third-party liability. Acquiescence to torture, as
it has been defined in U.S. non-refoulement cases, would broaden the
scope of the ATS to allow a suit against Mexican officials for their failure
to adequately prevent or investigate the femicides in Ciudad Judrez.
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University. Ph.D., Louisiana State
University 1996. This Article is dedicated to Diana Washington Valdez and Lourdes Portillo,
courageous and talented women who have been instrumental in calling attention to the
femicides in Ciudad Judrez. The author is grateful to Rebecca Coplan and Stacy Nykorchuk
for their tireless and invaluable research assistance. Thanks also to Sarah Bennett, Zeenat
Hasan, and several classes of students who helped me develop the ideas in this Article while
completing problem-based learning assignments. Special thanks to the fine editorial team of
the Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, more than 400 women have been murdered in Ciudad
Juirez, Mexico. Over 120 of these murders have been deemed sexual
homicides. Several high profile national and international reports have
placed blame on the local Mexican authorities for failing to exercise due
diligence in the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of these crimes
and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent these murders.1 The
"femicides" and the local Mexican government's poor response have been
widely publicized internationally by groups in Ciudad Juirez, Mexico, the
United States, and other countries through organized protests, petition
drives, and other actions.2 Several family members and NGOs have
initiated cases in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights against
the national government of Mexico 3 and these will most likely lead to
action by the Commission and, eventually, by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. However, the Inter-American Commission and Court have
both been faulted for'their lengthy procedures, and the Commission,
especially, has a poor record of state compliance with its decisions.4 These
institutions can make rulings against national governments, but they
cannot hold specific individuals in the Mexican government directly
accountable. This paper argues that in order to hold local Mexican officials
1. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEXICO-INTOLERABLE KILLINGS: 10 YEARS OF ABDUCTIONS
AND MURDERS OF WOMEN IN CIUDAD JUAREZ AND CHIHUAHUA (2003) [hereinafter Al Report];
Inter-Am. C.H.R., The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Judrez Mexico: The Right to Be
Free from Violence and Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 44 (March 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Inter-American Commission Report]; Comicion Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, Mexico
(CNDH), Evaluacion Integral De Las Acciones Realizadas Por Los Tres Ambitos De Bobierno en
Relacion A Las Feminicisios En El Municipio De Judrez, Chihuahua (2005), available at
http://www.cndh.org.mx/lacndh/informes/espec/espec.htm [hereinafter CNDH 2005];
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Report on Mexico produced by
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under article 8 of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter CEDAW Report].
2. See CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 244-254; KATHLEEN STAUDT & IRASEMA
CORONADO, FRONTERAS No MAS: TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER (2002);
DIANA WASHINGTON VALDEZ, COSECHA DE MUJERES: SAFARI EN EL DESIERTO MEXICANO (2005);
Melissa W. Wright, Paradoxes, Protests and the Mujeres de Negro of Northern Mexico, 12 GENDER,
PLACE & CULTURE 277 (2005).
3. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 26. The Commission reviewed
petitions 104/02, 281/02, 282/02, 283/02 and declared three cases admissible. Inter-American
Commission Case Reports on Admissibility Nos. 16/05, 17/05, 18/05, Feb. 24, 2005, available
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/toc.htm.
4. For an in-depth discussion of potential remedies in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, see William Paul Simmons, Remedies for the Women of Ciudad ]udrez through the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 4 Nw. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 492 (2006). Almost three years
elapsed from the time of the first petitions in these cases (March 6, 2002) to the time the
commission declared them admissible (February 24, 2005). See Louie Gilot, OAS Will Review 5
Murders of Women in fudrez, THE EL PASO TIMES, July 28, 2006, available at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mujuresdeJurez/message/53 (reporting that the
proceedings were going at a "snail's pace" and that "officials at the Commission said they did
not know how many years would pass before the families can see results").
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directly accountable for failing to adequately investigate and prevent the
femicides, victims of the femicides or their families could sue the officials
in U.S. federal courts on a theory of third-party liability under a once
obscure American law, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
5
Although the ATS was passed as part of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, it was relatively unused and unknown until 1981. Since then, victims
of human rights abuses from dozens of countries have used the ATS to
bring civil suits in U.S. courts against governmental officials and
multinational corporations for a range of abuses. The 2004 Supreme Court
case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain cleared up, for the most part, the most
fundamental legal issue in ATS jurisprudence: whether or not the ATS
affords new subject-matter jurisdiction.6 The next major controversy in ATS
jurisprudence appears to be whether the ATS allows for third-party
liability, 7 especially under theories of aiding and abetting.8 This issue is
particularly contentious because most, if not all, of the high-profile ATS
cases against multinational corporations involve theories of third-party
liability. The federal courts have divided on this issue. Some have ruled
that there is no aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, but most courts
have found aiding and abetting liability and other third-party liability
under a range of legal theories.9 Congress recently considered a bill, the
Alien Tort Statute Reform Act,10 that would have greatly reduced or even
eliminated third-party liability under the ATS. Several legal scholars have
argued for some form of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS,
although they differ on the standards that should be used to determine
such liability.1 I argue below that third-party liability, including aiding
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. IV 2000). See Grace C. Spencer, Her Body is a Battlefield: The
Applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Judrez, Mexico, 40
GONZ. L. REV. 503 (2004/2005) (examining whether the ATS could be used to remedy the
working conditions of the women in Judrez, especially after the Sosa decision, but not
exploring whether the ATS could be used to remedy the femicides themselves).
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. I use the term 'third-party liability' to refer to the liability of parties other than the
perpetrator (first party) and the victim (second party). Third-party liability is broader than
secondary liability in that it includes the primary liability of secondary actors. Third-party
liability thus is an umbrella term that includes, inter alia, aiding and abetting, command
responsibility, conspiracy, and the primary liability of secondary actors. I contend that
acquiescence, in the torture context, is a form of primary liability of secondary actors and is
thus a form of third-party liability. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. The liability of secondary actors under the command responsibility doctrine appears to
be well settled in ATS jurisprudence. See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,
1153-59 (11th Cir. 2005); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); Doe
v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1328-34 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
9. See infra, Part III.D.
10. S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill was withdrawn within a week by its sponsor,
Senator Feinstein. See Anthony J. Sebok, Senator Feinstein's Now-Withdrawn Statute Limiting
Non-Citizens' Tort Claims: How Would It Have Affected Abu-Ghraib-Related Civil Suits and Other
Similar Civil Actions?, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20051031.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2007).
11. David D. Christensen, Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien
Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219 (2005); Daniel Diskin,
The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort
[Vol. 10
3
Simmons: Liability of Secondary Actors under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding and Abetting and Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the Femicides of Ciudad Jua'rez
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
Alien Tort Liability of Secondary Actors
and abetting, should remain under the ATS, but that none of the proposed
standards would reach the actions or inactions of the local Mexican
authorities for the Ju~rez femicides. I then introduce acquiescence to
torture, as specified by the Convention Against Torture (CAT),12 as an
alternative form of third-party liability that would reach the local Mexican
officials. This theory would comport well with the law of nations as
defined by the ATS, and, since it is not a form of secondary liability but
rather primary liability for secondary actors, it could survive potential
court rulings against aiding and abetting liability under the ATS and might
even survive Congressional action intended to restrict third-party liability.
To summarize, acquiescence to torture is important to consider in the
ATS context for three reasons. First, if the Supreme Court ultimately holds
that the ATS does not extend to aiding and abetting liability, some primary
liability for secondary actors would likely still be imposed on those who
have acquiesced to torture. Second, if Congress acts to restrict third-party
liability under the ATS, it would not necessarily affect primary liability for
acquiescence to torture. Finally, a developing body of jurisprudence
defines acquiescence to torture to include a state's failure to prevent or
investigate abuses. This definition would broaden the scope of the ATS to
allow for claims against Mexican officials for their failure to adequately
prevent or investigate the femicides in Ciudad Judrez.
The first part of this paper provides an overview of the femicides in
Ciudad Judrez, highlighting the actions and inactions of the local Mexican
officials. Part II briefly outlines the development of ATS jurisprudence to
the present with a special emphasis on the Sosa case. Part III provides an in-
depth analysis of the aiding and abetting controversy, focusing on the Doe
v. Unocal cases, in which this issue received its most extensive legal
hearing, as well as recent post-Sosa cases and scholarly writings advocating
various standards for aiding and abetting liability. Part III concludes with
the argument that none of the proposed standards for aiding and abetting
liability would reach local Mexican officials for the femicides in JuArez. Part
IV introduces the "acquiescence" language from the CAT, discusses how
various international and national courts have defined this language, and
argues that such an interpretation can lead to primary liability of secondary
actors under the ATS. A major focus of Part IV is the definition of
acquiescence in U.S. non-refoulement cases, which includes the failure to
adequately prevent and investigate torture. Part V considers possible
Statute, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 805 (2005); John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal:
A Paquete Habana Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231 (2003); Paul L.
Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and
Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47 (2003). But see
Helena Lynch, Liability for Torts in Violation of International Law: No Hook Under Sosa for
Secondary, Complicit Actors, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 757, 758 (2005/2006) ("[Slince neither the
aiding and abetting nor other asserted standards for rendering liable secondary actors satisfy
Sosa, complicit actors are essentially untouchable under the ATS unless they are in direct
control of the primary actors.").
12. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984), Article 2 (1) [hereinafter CAT].
2007]
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objections to the use of acquiescence as a form of third-party liability in
ATS cases. The concluding section places my proposals in the context of the
progressive development of human rights law, including the evolving
jurisprudence on state responsibility for the actions of private actors,
particularly in the context of violence against women.
I. THE FEMICIDES IN CIUDAD JUAREZ:
ACTIONS AND INACTIONS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
Ciudad Judrez is a large, sprawling border town that has experienced
rapid growth due to increased cross-border trade, massive migration, and
the proliferation of maquiladoras - assembly plants mostly owned by
American companies that are attracted to the area by low wages and lax
labor and environmental regulations.13 The greater Judrez/El Paso
metropolitan area is also one of the largest transit points for illegal drugs
and illegal immigrants into the United States, and over the past decade
Juirez has experienced a substantial rise in organized crime and gang
activities. 14 Judrez's rapid growth has far outpaced social services, has
created large areas of destitution, and has substantially disrupted the
traditional social fabric.15
Since 1993, over 400 women have been murdered in Ju~rez 16 and many
women have disappeared. 17 Overall, the murder rates for men in Juirez
still far exceed those for women. However, the murder rates for women
have increased much faster than the murder rates for men in Jua1rez, and
are much higher than in comparable cities.18 Of the murdered women,
13. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 3740; Al Report, supra note 1,
at 22-24; ROSA LINDA FREGOSO, MEXICANA ENCOUNTERS: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES ON
THE BORDERLANDS 7 (2003) (reporting that in the 1990s 350 maquiladoras in Jurez employed
approximately 180,000 employees).
14. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 39.
15. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 22-25.
16. The number of murders has been the subject of much controversy, with estimates
ranging from 230 to 470. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 41 (noting
that the Mexican government reported to the IACHR Special Rapporteur that 268 women
were killed from 1993 to 2002); CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 61 (reporting over 320
murders, but noting that NGOs report 359); Mark Ensalaco, Murder in Ciudad Judrez A Parable
of Women's Struggle for Human Rights, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 417, 419 (2006)
(concluding that, in general, the Mexican authorities' numbers are the lowest, followed by the
press, and then the NGOs); Gilot, supra note 4 (noting that Amnesty International reported
approximately 470 murders between 1993 and 2005); SEAN MARIANO GARCIA, THE LATIN
AMERICA WORKING GROUP EDUCATION FUND, SCAPEGOATS OF JUAREZ: THE MISUSE OF JUSTICE IN
PROSECUTING WOMEN'S MURDERS IN CHIHUAHUA, MEXICO (2005), available at
www.lawg.org/docs/ScapegoatsofJuJ.rez.pdf (reporting that the Special Prosecutor's office is
looking into 349 murders).
17. The number of disappeared is even more disputed, ranging from the government's
estimate of forty-four to the National Human Rights Commission's figure of 4,500. See
CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 73. See also AI Report, supra note 1, at 31-33, 82-83.
18. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 42; Al Report, supra note 1, at
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approximately 140 were sexually assaulted 19 and a large proportion of
these have been labeled "serial killings" 20 because they fit a very specific
pattern of rape, mutilation, and killing. Many of the victims were held
captive for days and perhaps even months or years, during which they
were subjected to brutal torture.21 Most of the victims were young
(approximately eleven to twenty-two years old) 22 and poor.23 A substantial
number (perhaps one-fourth to one-third) worked in the maquiladoras,24
and many were students.25 Many of the other murders, labeled situational
murders by the Mexican authorities, stem from domestic violence, drug
trafficking, gang violence, intra-familial violence, quarrels, etc. Many have
claimed that because violence against women appears to be tacitly
accepted by the authorities, the impunity for the so-called serial murders
has fueled an increase in the situational murders. 26 Both types of murders
share similar root causes in gender discrimination 27 and a series of
structural factors.
28
19. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 44 (noting a government estimate
that, as of 2002, seventy-six "killings fit this pattern" of sexual homicide); Al Report, supra
note 1, at 7 (reporting 137 sexual assaults among the 370 murders); Alfredo Corchado, Report:
Judrez Victims Sexually Assaulted: Higher Number Lends Credence to Theory of Serial Killer or
Killers, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20, 2005, at A20 (citing a Colegio de la Frontera
Norte study that found 142 of 382 murder victims were sexually assaulted). See generally
CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 140 (arguing that the controversy over the number of dead
could easily be resolved and urging "the government to put forth the exact data, explain the
motives and report on the status of the investigations").
20. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 44.
21. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 70; AI Report, supra note 1, at 80-81 (detailing specific
types of abuses).
22. Al Report, supra note 1, at 27, 79-80.
23. AI Report, supra note 1, at 79-80; FREGOSO, supra note 13, at 2.
24. For an excellent analysis of the victims, see Julia Monarrez Fragoso, Serial Sexual
Femicide in Ciudad Judrez: 1993-2001, 25 DEBATE FEMINISTA 279 (2002) (reporting that 15.7% of
victims worked in maquiladoras). See also Al Report, supra note 1, at 80 (approximately one-
third, or thirthy-two of ninety-five, of sexual homicide victims worked in maquiladoras).
Several scholars have disputed the much publicized link between the femicides and the
maquiladoras. See FREGOSO, supra note 13, at 7-8; Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Body Counts on the
Mexico-U.S. Border: Feminicidio, reification, and the Theft of Mexicana Subjectivity, 4
CHICANA/LATINA STUDIES 22, 34 (2004) (arguing that "the maquiladoras narrative can easily
absorb the feminicido into a totalizing account of global maldevelopment so that it is unclear
precisely what crime is actually being prosecuted, and who the victims ultimately are."). But
see Griselda Vega, Maquiladora's Lost Women: The Killing Fields of Mexico-Are NAFTA and
NAALC Providing the Needed Protection? 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 137 (2006); Alicia Gaspar de
Alba, The Maquiladora Murders, 1993-2003, 28 AZTLAN: J. CHICANO STUD. 1 (Fall 2003); Deborah
M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an Understanding of the Gender-Based
Murders of Ciudad Judrez, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 795 (2005) (tracing links between
economic liberalization and the femicides).
25. Cf. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 63; Monarrez Fragoso, supra note 24.
26. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 36 ("The denial of an effective
response both springs from and feeds back into the perception that violence against women -
most illustratively domestic violence - is not a serious crime."); id. 7 ("The impunity in
which such crimes are then left sends the message that such violence is tolerated, thereby
fueling its perpetuation.").
27. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 164.
28. For nuanced discussions of the structural (economic, social, cultural) factors behind
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Despite local and international pressure, the murders have continued
unabated, and recently have expanded to Chihuahua City, the capital of
the state of Chihuahua, approximately 200 miles away, and perhaps to
other Mexican cities.29 A wide range of theories have been advanced
regarding the motives of the perpetrators, including violent pornography,
the harvesting of body parts, satanic rituals, and some sort of macabre
ritual or even sporting event for wealthy young men of the city or drug
traffickers. 30 Sorting through these various theories and structural factors is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper concentrates on the
failure of the local authorities to exercise due diligence in the investigation
and prevention of the murders.
A. Actions and Inactions of the Mexican Government
For the first ten years or so after the femicides began, the Mexican
authorities did little to investigate or prevent them. Typical complaints of
victims' families, NGOs, and international organizations included: little
investigation especially in missing persons cases, 31 missing evidence from
case files, 32 chronic delays in launching investigations into disappeared
women, 33 sloppy autopsies,34 delays in conducting DNA testing,35 and
contamination and confusion of DNA evidence, in particular in the case of
the eight bodies found in a cotton field in 2001.36 Other complaints include:
the failure to follow up leads, 37 failure to gather evidence from crime
scenes, 38 and failure to seal off crime scenes. 39 Investigations have been
irrevocably and inexplicably botched by leaking information to the press,
40
and in numerous cases of sexual assaults there has been no forensic
these murders, see Ensalaco, supra note 16, at 420-21, and Rosa Linda Fregoso, 'We Want Them
Alive!': the Politics and Culture of Human Rights, 12 SOCIAL IDENTITIES 109 (2006).
29. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 7 56, and Lydia Alpizar, Impunity
and Women's Rights in Ciudad Judrez, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE 27, 27 (2003).
30. For the most thorough discussion of these theories based upon years of hands-on
investigative reporting, see Washington Valdez, supra note 2. See also Al Report, supra note 1,
at 12-13; Melissa W. Wright, From Protest to Politics: Sex Work, Women's Worth, and Ciudad
Judrez Modernity, 94 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N. OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 364, 369 (2004); SEIORITA
EXTRAVIADA (Xochitl Films 2001).
31. Al Report, supra note 1, at 37-41.
32. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 70.
33. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 77 54-55.
34. Id. 71.
35. Id. 47.
36. Al Report, supra note 1, at 43-46; CEDAW Report, supra note 1, T 95.
37. Al Report, supra note 1, at 58.
38. Diana Washington Valdez, Families, Officials, Claim Cover-Ups Keep Killings from Being
Solved, EL PASO TIMES, June 23, 2002 at 1A.
39. See CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 88 (presenting an overview of investigative
mistakes). See also Al Report, supra note 1, at 48. Cf. Monarrez Fragoso, supra note 24, at 280
(quoting the new Governor of Chihuahua who said "all we've got from the previous
administration is 21 bags with bones.... We don't know what the circumstances were for
those acts. The files are poorly put together... How do we investigate these homicides?").
40. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, $ 81.
[Vol. 10
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analysis. 41 The Mexican National Human Rights Commission found that
"in the 36 cases it reviewed, authorities failed to perform many of the 37
separate procedures required in homicide cases involving sexual assault."
42
In one case, the "the ground was dug up [by the authorities] in the vicinity
of the discovery [of the body], apparently to conceal any evidence."
43
Family members have reported returning to 4rime scenes several months
after the initial police investigation and finding clothing and other
evidence that the police had not gathered.44 The failure to adequately
investigate the murders and disappearances has led to a local practice
called "rastreo," where the families and friends of missing and murdered
women join together to comb through the surrounding desert looking for
remains and other clues. 45 The authorities have also spurned international
efforts, from the FBI and others, to assist in the investigations.
46
The investigations have also been plagued by claims of cover-ups by
government authorities and claims that the police planted or falsified
evidence to implicate specific individuals.47 Several members of the
investigative teams have resigned, and they later discussed pressure to
plant evidence and even alleged complicity between police and the
murderers. 48 Finally the reluctance to transfer cases to the federal level,
even after the members of the Mexican Congress urged it, has slowed
investigations, especially into allegations of complicity of local authorities
in the murders.
49
The failure to adequately conduct investigations is often linked to the
failure to prevent crimes because a culture of impunity is established that
perpetuates crimes.50 Also, the systemic delays in investigating missing
persons cases signal a failure to adequately prevent these crimes, especially
in several well-known cases where witnesses observed the forcible
abduction of women.51 The Mexican authorities have also failed to take
adequate operational steps to prevent the crimes. Since 1998, when the
Mexican Human Rights Commission issued its first report on the
femicides, several organizations have outlined a series of measures to
prevent the murders, but the local authorities have failed to adequately
41. Id. 82. See also Al Report, supra note 1, at 42,46-48.
42. Ensalaco, supra note 16, at 422.
43. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 90.
44. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 48.
45. See Schmidt Camacho, supra note 24, at 43-48 (presenting a moving personal account
of a "rastreo").
46. See generally Monarrez Fragoso, supra note 24.
47. Al Report, supra note 2, at 49-50; Washington Valdez, supra note 38; Thompson, supra
note 18 (quoting Commissioner Morfin: "[Wihy did the authorities go to such lengths to
fabricate cases? Maybe it was because of incompetence. Or maybe it was because they didn't
want to be exposed.").
48. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 96-97.
49. Id. 7 151-158.
50. Cf. Kilic v. Turkey, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H. R. 77, 100, 78 (holding that the obligation to
protect life includes, by implication, effective investigation when individuals are killed by
force).
51. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 77 80-81.
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follow up with these recommendations. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in 2003 found that the Mexican authorities had failed to
adequately follow up on the recommendations of its own human rights
commission and that when the Mexican government has acted, it has failed
to provide enough attention to the more general problem of violence
against women, focusing instead on the so-called "serial killings."5 2 The
State has also failed to increase its outreach efforts to civil society groups or
to conduct a general educational campaign to prevent violence against
women.53 Finally, the authorities have failed to protect those it should
know are at risk of harm.54
Although not specifically a failure to investigate or prevent the
murders, the authorities' treatment of the victims' families clearly evinces
their view of these crimes. The authorities have spurned repeated attempts
by victims' families to gain information on the progress of investigations. 55
The authorities have even been accused of intimidating or harassing family
members56 and being reluctant to follow up on threats to family members. 57
In addition, families and activists have often faced incrimination from local
government officials and business leaders, because the publicity of the
crimes and their demands for justice supposedly tarnish the image of the
city and reduce investment and tourism. 58 One activist was led to declare
"that the governor and his attorney general had 'declared war' on civil
organizations instead of declaring war against the criminals."59
The Mexican officials have spent a great deal of effort creating
alternative discourses that attempt to explain away the murders. They have
blamed the victims themselves by creating a discriminatory discourse, in
which they claim that the murders could be justified because the victims
were prostitutes, because of the victims' manner of dress, or because the
victims frequented specific bars or areas of the city.60 Rosa Linda Fregoso
argued that the authorities have attempted to justify or divert attention
away from their inadequate investigations by emphasizing the
52. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 154.
53. Id. 158.
54. See, e.g., Politically Explosive Murder Rocks Mexican City, FRONTERA NORTE SUR, Jan. 30,
2006, available at http://www.mexidata.info/id770.html.
55. See, e.g., Al Report, supra note 1, at 10.
56. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 9 113-131; Marina Montemayor, Second Suspect Held in
Mexico Slayings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/printer-
friendly wires/2006Aug21/0,4675,MexicoBorderSlayings,00.html (reporting that the federal
government closed 14 case files that they were reviewing even though the crimes had not
been solved).
57. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 9 130-131.
58. Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Ciudadana X Gender Violence and the Denationalization of
Women's Rights in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico 5 THE NEW CENTENNIAL REVIEW 255, 273-74 (2005). See
also Wright, supra note 2, at 286, 288 (noting that members of the local business community
and other community leaders have urged the victims' families to keep quiet so as to not hurt
the public image of Judrez and some have even accused the victims' families of exploiting the
murders for their own gain).
59. Wright, supra note 2, at 286. See also Al Report, supra note 1, at 60-62.
60. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, TT 73, 80; CEDAW Report, supra
note 1, 9 67.
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"nonnormative behaviors" of the women and girls, "accusing them of
transgressing sexual norms, either of lesbianism or of leading a 'doble vida'
(double life) - that is, engaging in respectable work by day and sex work
by night - as though nontraditional sexual behavior justified their
killings."61 The Mexican officials also have also attempted to "normalize"
the murder statistics by disaggregating the serial and situational murders62
or by claiming that a large number of the murders had been solved. For
example, the Mexican government claimed to the Special Rapporteur of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that 179 of the 268 murders
had been resolved.63 However, the government claimed a case was
resolved if:
it had enough information upon which to make a presumption as
to the motive and culpability of a presumed perpetrator and that
the person had been presented before a judge ("consignado"). It did
not necessarily signify that a particular individual had been
formally charged or tried. It was not clearly explained, however,
how indicia not yet sufficient to support formal accusation and
prosecution was nonetheless sufficient to make a determination as
to motive and to declare the crime "resolved." 64
The authorities have also blamed the murders on structural factors such as
the supposed "social disintegration of victims' families" 65 as if to absolve
the criminals of the murders and the authorities of their own failure to
adequately investigate and/or prevent these crimes.
The national and international reports on the femicides have all
reached very similar conclusions. The Inter-American Commission
concluded that "there had been no real commitment to an effective
response" and that the official response "has been markedly deficient."66
Amnesty International concluded that the investigations exhibit "a pattern
of intolerable negligence" 67 and that "the pattern of non-compliance with
the minimum requirement of the 'due diligence' standard has been so
marked that it calls into question whether the authorities have the will and
commitment to put an end to the murders and abductions in Chihuahua
and the violence against women they exemplify." 68 A comprehensive
report drafted in line with Article 8 of the Optional Protocol of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) found "grave and systematic violations" 69 of the
61. FREGOSO, supra note 13, at 3; See also Wright, supra note 30, at 377 (reporting that police
frequently ask victims' families "are you sure she didn't lead a double life?").
62. See Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, T 81.
63. Id.
64. Id. 782.
65. Wright, supra note 30, at 378.
66. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 77 4, 34.
67. Al Report, supra note 2, at 71.
68. Id. at 72.
69. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 7 259.
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Convention and that there had been "systematic violations of women's
rights, founded in a culture of violence and discrimination that is based on
women's alleged inferiority, a situation that has resulted in impunity."70
The Mexican government's commissions have reached similar
conclusions. A 1998 report by the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission (CNDH) documented a series of inadequacies in the
investigation and concluded that the impunity resulting fromthe local
government officials has perpetuated the crimes.71 A spokesman for the
CNDH says that its 2003 report "provides evidence of everything said so
far by international and local groups regarding negligence and carelessness
in the conduct of the investigations." 72 Guadelupe Morfin, the head of the
Commission for the Prevention and Elimination of Violence Against
Women in Ciudad Juirez, the official who was charged by President Fox
with reviewing the investigation of these murders, concluded that the
investigations were a "faqade, an apparent cover-up."73 The CNDH in 2005
concluded that, "because the Mexican State was allowing these crimes to
remain in impunity, it was encouraging their persistence." 74
Many official reports have laid the blame on specific individuals or
offices within the Mexican government. The CNDH, based on an analysis
of thirty-six murders, called for the "sanctioning of the officials who had
failed to comply with their duties under the law."75 After reviewing 150
case files, a federal Special Prosecutor "concluded that there was probable
cause for criminal and administrative investigations into more than 100
Chihuahua state public officials for negligence, omission and other related
offences." 76 However, attempts to bring indictments against these officials
have been stymied by local courts.
77
The Mexican government has made some arrests in the cases, and
several of the alleged perpetrators were ultimately prosecuted. These
included tw6 bus drivers78 and several members of local gangs.
79 Most of
the activists working to end the femicides believe that few, if any, of these
men were connected to the crimes, in part because many of those arrested
confessed only after being subjected to systematic torture.8 0 It is now clear
70. Id. 261.
71. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 7 72-73. See also CEDAW Report,
supra note 1, 28 (parts of the CNDH 1998 report "were rejected by State authorities"); Al
Report, supra note 1, at 35 (representatives were told in 2003 that the recommendations "only
referred to the previous government and that therefore they could not comply with it").
72. Latin American Weekly Report, November 25, 2003, at 5.
73. Alfredo Corchado, Report: Judrez Suspects Tortured: Mexican Sees Troubling Pattern in
cases of U.S. Woman, Others, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 12, 2005, at 17A.
74. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 34.
75. Id. 5.
76. Amnesty International, Mexico: Justice Fails in Ciudad Judrez and in the City of Chihuahua,
Al Index AMR 41/007/2005, Feb. 28, 2005.
77. Id.
78. Kent Patterson, Amnesty International Revisits Mexican Mass Femicide, FRONTERA NORTE
SUR, Aug. 17,2005, http://www.mexidata.info/id577.html.
79. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 83.
80. Id. 49 (noting that some Mexican officials "expressed" to the IACHR's Special
[Vol. 10
11
Simmons: Liability of Secondary Actors under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding and Abetting and Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the Femicides of Ciudad Jua'rez
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
Alien Tort Liability of Secondary Actors
that a secondary human rights abuse has occurred: the torture of a series of
"scapegoats" by Mexican authorities.8 1 In addition, two of the attorneys
working on the case involving the bus drivers were gunned down in nearly
identical fashion three years apart.82 One of the bus drivers, Gustavo
Gonzalez Mesa, was found dead under suspicious circumstances in his
prison cell 83 while the conviction of the other, Victor Garcia Uribe, was
eventually overturned.84
In the face of increased local and international pressure, the Mexican
authorities made some attempts, often cosmetic, to investigate and prevent
the murders, but these investigations have been plagued by little or no
institutional follow-up.85 Mexican President Vicente Fox appointed a
special prosecutor to oversee the investigations in 1998,86 and a
Commission for the Prevention and Elimination of Violence against
Women in Ciudad Juirez was established in 2003 with human rights
activist Guadalupe Morfin in charge.8 7 The most promising recent reform
was a forty-point action plan, drafted by Special Commissioner Morfin,
that attempts to deal with the problem both with specific immediate action
steps and from a structural perspective, including prevention of crime,
social advancement, and human rights of women.88 To date, the program
has produced mixed results.
89
However, the situation on the ground in Juirez has not improved
significantly.90 Several scholars and activists have suggested that the Juadrez
Rapporteur "serious concerns about allegations that these detainees had been tortured to
coerce confessions").
81. Al Report, supra note 1, at 50-54, (discussing general allegations of torture in Mexican
investigations). Cf. Special Report, Presumed Guilty? Criminal Justice and Human Rights in
Mexico, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 801 (2001) (providing an overview of the role of torture in
Mexican investigations and attempts at reforms). One independent report estimates that
"torture may have been used to extract false confessions in almost half of the Juirez crimes in
which arrests have been made." MARIANO GARCIA, supra note 16, at 12. See also Alma
Guillermoprieto, Letter from Mexico: A Hundred Women, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2003, at 88-
93 (explaining that those tortured included a U.S. citizen and her husband who were later
released). In July 2006, Miguel David Meza, who was accused of one of the Chihuahua City
murders was released after claiming that his confession was given under torture. An
investigation has now been launched into the torture allegations, and a former Chihuahua
Attorney General is under investigation for the torture. Angel Zubia Garicia and Sonia
Aguilar, Femicide Suspect Freed: Former Top Law Enforcement Official Eyed FRONTERA NORTE SUR,
July 10, 2006, http://www.nmsu.edu/-frontera/.
82. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 7 66.
83. Id. 50.
84. Patterson, supra note 78.
85. Inter-American Commission Report, supra note 1, 75.
86. MEXICO SOLIDARITY NETWORK, FEMICIDES IN CIUDAD JUAREZ (2004), available at
http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/site/specialreports/2004femicides.
87. Press Release, Amnesty International, Mexico: Justice Fails in Ciudad Juirez and the
City of Chihuahua (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAMR4
10072005.
88. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 77 172-191. See also MEXICO SOLIDARITY NETWORK, supra
note 86.
89. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 7 200-211.
90. Townhall.com, Police Recover Woman's Body in Mexico,
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police may have been directly complicit in these murders, 91 but I argue that
even if they are not directly complicit, some Mexican authorities could face
civil liability because of their systematic failure to investigate and prevent
the killings.
II. THE ATS THROUGH SOSA
This Article argues that the families of the femicide victims should
bring suit in the United States federal courts under the ATS,92 which in its
current wording states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 93 The ATS was passed by
the first U.S. Congress as part of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 but lay
virtually dormant before being revived in 1980 by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.94
In Filartiga, plaintiffs alleged that Pefia, while serving as Inspector
General of Police in Paraguay, had kidnapped and tortured to death the
seventeen-year-old son of Dr. Filartiga, because of the doctor's opposition
to the Paraguayan government led by President Alfredo Stroessner.95 Upon
learning that Pefia was living in the United States, Dr. Filartiga and his
daughter brought suit in federal district court claiming damages under the
http://www.townhall.com/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ContentGuid=807e82cb-00ec-473a-
a674-19666ae66925 (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (noting that as of the end of July, fourteen
women had been killed in Judrez in 2006).
91. CEDAW Report, supra note 1, 89; Washington Valdez, supra note 2; Ensalaco, supra
note 16, at 424-25; SEI4ORITA EXTRAVIADA, supra note 30.
92. In order to hear a claim under the ATS, the federal court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant(s), which is established when the defendant "receives
sufficient notice of the complaint and action against them." Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258,
1276 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Generally, the defendant must be served with a summons in the United
States in order for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Considering that Judrez is a
border town, and that officials frequently visit the United States for business and personal
reasons, this should be less of a problem than it has been with defendants from other
countries. Another potential obstacle to ATS claims is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). On this issue, the circuit courts have been split. Some have ruled that the FSIA only
applies to national governments and therefore all government officials, besides heads of
states, can be sued under most circumstances. Other circuits have ruled that the Act applies
only to government officials acting in their official capacity. Under this interpretation, the
FSIA "will not shield an official who acts beyond the scope of his authority," Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990), and officials found to acquiesce in
torture would be acting beyond their authority. Other hurdles common in ATS cases, such as
statute of limitations and forum non conveniens, would most likely not be applicable in a case
related to the femicides, or might only restrict the specific cases that could be brought.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. IV 2000).
94. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For thorough historical accounts of the ATS, see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002); William S. Dodge, The
Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 221 (1996); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995).
95. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. See generally RICHARD ALAN WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THE
CASE THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
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ATS and several other statutes and treaties. 96 The Second Circuit Court
ultimately held that "[h]aving examined the sources from which customary
international law is derived - the usage of nations, judicial opinions and
the works of jurists - we conclude that official torture is now prohibited
by the law of nations" 97 and thereby is actionable under the ATS. On
remand, the district court granted a default judgment in favor of the
Filartigas, and each of the plaintiffs was awarded five million dollars in
punitive damages.
98
Since then, dozens of ATS cases have been brought in federal courts. At
first, the claims were mainly against foreign government officials, but
recently, more of the cases are focusing on claims against private
individuals and multi'national corporations. 99 Until 2004, the Supreme
Court had only issued one ruling on the ATS, which primarily addressed
the tangential issue of whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
protected foreign governments from suits under the statute.10 0 Without
direction from above, the meaning of the ATS was found amongst many
conflicting federal court decisions.101
In the most important controversy, some judges and scholars claimed
that the ATS did not grant new subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal
district courts or create a private right of action, but basically allowed
aliens a federal forum to bring suits under pre-existing U.S. law. The
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain finally addressed this substantive
jurisdiction issue.10 2 The procedural history of the case is long and complex.
Dr. Alvarez-Machain was allegedly present at a home in Mexico in 1985
where a DEA agent was held and tortured before being killed.10 3 Dr.
Alvarez-Machain allegedly prolonged the agent's life for additional
torture.104 Several people had been convicted in this incident, and an
indictment was issued in 1990 for the arrest of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 1°5 The
U.S. hired a former Mexican police officer named Jose Francisco Sosa to
bring the doctor into the United States.10 6 Sosa and several accomplices
abducted Alvarez-Machain and, after spending one evening in a motel,
they flew him across the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. authorities took
him into custody. 10 7 The ensuing criminal case, which led to a separate
96. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
97. Id. at 884.
98. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. See Christensen, supra note 11, at 1237 (noting that "[tihe initial wave of post-Filartiga
suits involved victims suing individuals acting in their official capacity").
100. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
101. Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("This case
deals with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by the Supreme Court. We confront
at every turn broad and novel questions about the definition and application of the 'law of
nations.'").
102. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
103. Id. at 697.
104. Id. at 697-98.
105. Id. at 697.
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ruling in the Supreme Court,1° 8 was eventually dismissed as too
speculative.9 9 Upon his return to Mexico, Alvarez-Machain commenced a
suit against the United States and Sosa for numerous tort claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the ATS. His ATS claim argued that
his abduction and transport to the United States was a violation of the law
of nations. The district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss
on the FTCA claim, but awarded Alvarez-Machain summary judgment and
$25,000 in damages for his detention in Mexico under the ATS." 0 The
circuit court then affirmed the ATS ruling and reversed the FTCA
dismissal."i The United States and Sosa appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, first reversed the
circuit court's ruling on the FTCA claim, finding that "the FTCA's foreign
country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign
country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred."" 2 The
Court went on to hold that the ATS does not create a new cause of action;
instead, the ATS is only a jurisdictional statute, based in part on the fact
that the ATS was originally included in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which dealt with jurisdictional issues." 3 However, the Court's
inquiry did not end there. If the statute was purely jurisdictional, what was
its function? Was the ATS moot until Congress passed further laws, or was
it operational from the time it was passed? After examining the "ambient
law" of the time, the Court concluded that the ATS was not "stillborn," but
that it was intended to cover a very specific set of violations "of the law of
nations [that] would have been recognized within the common law of the
time." 14 This interpretation of the ambient law is reinforced by some early
cases and by Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion on participation by
American citizens in "the French plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra
Leone."" 5 Bradford clearly referenced the ATS when he wrote, "[blut there
can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by
these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the
United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a
treaty of the United States."116
In Sosa, the majority concluded that Congress in 1789 most likely
intended the ATS to cover only three types of offences under the law of
nations: 1) violation of safe conduct; 2) infringement of the rights of
108. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
109. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The [district]
court concluded that the case against Alvarez was based on 'suspicion and ... hunches but...
no proof,' and that the government's theories were 'whole cloth, the wildest speculation'.")
110. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.
111. Id. at 698.
112. Id. at 712.
113. Id. at 713-14.
114. Id. at 714.
115. Id. at 720-21.
116. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y. Gen. 57 (1795).
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ambassador; and 3) piracy.11 7 It then contended that the ATS was a living
statute that could cover a very limited number of additional offenses as the
law of nations evolves.11 8 However, the majority warned that courts should
exercise considerable constraint in expanding this list for several reasons.
First, the role of the courts in determining common law has changed since
1789.119 Second, the role of the federal courts in making common law has
been greatly reduced, especially after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.120 Third, "this
Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private
right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority
of cases." 121 Further, the courts should be wary of interfering in issues that
affect foreign affairs, "since many attempts by federal courts to craft
remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise
risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if
at all, with great caution."122 Finally, the courts "have no congressional
mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of
nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of the
judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial
creativity." 123 But the Court held that these reasons for caution are not
reasons to completely disregard something akin to federal common law in
this instance; after all, the ATS is a living statute. Therefore, the courts can
exercise what the majority calls "residual common law discretion,"' 24 but it
warned "the judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a
narrow class of international norms today." 125
The majority then outlined what I will call the "Sosa Test" to determine
what claims are actionable under the ATS: "We are persuaded that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar
when § 1350 was enacted."1 26 The Court then gave credence to how the
117. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
118. Id. at 724-25 ("We assume, too, that no development in the two centuries from the
enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any
relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.")
(citation omitted).
119. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 ("Now, however, in most cases where a court is asked to state or
formulate a common law principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the
law is not so much found or discovered as it is either made or created.").
120. Id. at 749-50.
121. Id. at 727.
122. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28.
123. Id. at 728.
124. Id. at 738.
125. Id. at 729.
126. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Justice Scalia did not join the majority on this section, arguing
that the reasons for urging judicial caution in this area are so overwhelming that the courts
should never expand on the original list. He wrote, "creating a federal command (federal
common law) out of 'international norms,' and then constructing a cause of action to enforce
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ATS has been interpreted in Filartiga and after by the circuit courts:
This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue
before it reached this Court. See Filartiga, ("[F]or purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become - like the pirate and slave trader
before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind"); Tel-
Oren, (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the "limits of
section 1350's reach" be defined by "a handful of heinous actions--
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms");
see also In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation ("Actionable
violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific,
universal, and obligatory").
127
The Court adds one further important caveat: "the determination
whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the
practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the
federal courts." 28 Justice Breyer's concurrence adds an additional layer of
specificity to the norms considered actionable under the ATS. He argues
that any consideration of international law should also consider
international comity and therefore should limit the tortious actions to those
that border on universal jurisdiction. He writes, "[t]oday international law
will sometimes similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as to
certain universally condemned behavior but also procedural agreement
that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior. That
subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes."
129
Finally, as to the facts of the case, the Court compared Alvarez-
Machain's claim to the Sosa Test and found it wanting: "[A] single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful
authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal
remedy."'130
In the wake of Sosa dozens of ATS cases have been working their way
through the federal courts alleging a plethora of human rights abuses that
involve dozens of countries and multinational corporations. For example,
cases have been brought against U.S. government contractors for alleged
abuses at Abu Ghraib prison131 and Guantanamo Bay,132 against Osama Bin
Laden,133 and against multinational corporations, such as Pfizer,2 8 Exxon-
that command through the purely jurisdictional grant of the ATS, is nonsense upon stilts." (Id.
at 743).
127. Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
128. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 762 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. at 738.
131. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
132. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
133. Mwani v. Osama Bin Laden, 417 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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Mobil,135 and Caterpillar.1 36 Claims include allegations against a banking
group for aiding and abetting Saddam Hussein's use of chemical
weapons, 137 and for actions of governmental officials from Sudan,
138
China,139and Israel. 40 Substantively, cases have involved abuses stemming
from slavery in the United States before the Civil War,141 apartheid in
South Africa, 142 the 9/11 terrorist attacks,143 and mistreatment of aliens in
private prisons in the United States.144 For the most part, these cases have
either not met the Sosa test or they have been denied based upon other
legal hurdles such as the statute of limitations 145 or the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
146
However, several large settlements have resulted from ATS claims,
including two cases involving abuses during the Salvadoran civil war of
the 1980s. In a much-publicized case, three Salvadoran refugees brought
claims against the former Minister of Defense of El Salvador and the
Director General of the El Salvador National Guard for torture under the
ATS (for two plaintiffs as the third was not an alien) and the Torture
Victims Protection Act. After several appeals, most notably on a statute of
limitations claim, the plaintiffs were awarded $54.6 million in a jury trial.
147
In another recent case, a jury found the former Vice-Minister of Defense of
El Salvador liable for the torture of four Salvadorans and awarded them
five million dollars in compensatory damages and four million dollars in
punitive damages.
148
Il. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
Third-party liability is shaping up to be the most important current
controversy in post-Sosa cases, and this issue is mostly framed in the
context of aiding and abetting liability. In the past few years, the district
courts have split on the aiding and abetting issue. Doe v. Unocal, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case that many thought would decide the
issue was settled out of court and hence does not provide guidance in this
134. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed.Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003).
135. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
136. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
137. Stutts v. De Dietrich Group, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47638 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006).
138. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20414
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005).
139. Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
140. Doe v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005).
141. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
142. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).
143. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re Terrorist Attacks), 349 F. Supp.2d 765
(S.D.N. Y. 2005).
144. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., civ., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26060 (D. N.J. Nov. 1, 2005).
145. E.g., Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 217 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. E.g., Auginda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,2005).
147. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).
148. Bruce Zagaris, International Human Rights, 22 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 78 (2006).
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area. 149 Legal scholars are now chiming in.
A. Violations of International Law by Non-State Actors
The aiding and abetting issue is closely related to the question of
whether the law of nations can be applied to non-state actors. Traditionally,
the law of nations applied, for the most part, only to the actions of states
and state actors. Some independent individual actions such as piracy and
slave trading have risen to the level of violations of the laws of nations.
Also, in the post-World War II tribunals, several individuals and private
corporations were found guilty of violating what would best be considered
the law of nations. Finally, some international treaties such as the Rome
Statute have clearly recognized individual responsibility for human rights
abuses.
However, several ATS cases have limited the reach of the statute to
state actors. In an early case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "[o]nly
individuals who have acted under official authority or under color of such
authority may violate international law .... ,15 Although a district court
will still follow this holding occasionally, 151 most courts now are abiding by
the standard set in Kadic v. Karadzic.1 2 KaradNi, who was the titular head
of state for the unrecognized Republic of Srpska, was accused of "genocide,
rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic
inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death." 153 The district court
accepted Karadi 's claim that he was not acting as a state actor and "acts
committed by non-state actors do not violate the law of nations."' 54 The
Second Circuit reversed after examining treaties, U.S. codes, and previous
international cases. It held that individual actors could commit some
offenses against the law of nations (genocide and war crimes, for example),
while others could not. The court concluded:
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the
modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that
certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals.
5 5
149. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
150. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1992).
151. E.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
152. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 237.
154. Id. (citing Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
155. Id. at 239. See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Cf. Christensen, supra note 11, at 1242 (noting that "[tiorture, extrajudicial
killing, and crimes against humanity would be the most obvious examples of jus cogens norms
still requiring state action.").
[Vol. 10
19
Simmons: Liability of Secondary Actors under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding and Abetting and Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the Femicides of Ciudad Jua'rez
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
Alien Tort Liability of Secondary Actors
B. Third-Party Liability: Doe v. Unocal
Once it is established that non-state actors can violate the law of
nations, it remains to be determined whether state or non-state actors can
be held liable as third parties to torts in violation of the law of nations. The
most extended discussion on this issue surrounds the Doe v. Unocal cases
that were brought in state and federal courts for violations that occurred in
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma.
It had been alleged that the Myanmar military regime had committed
massive human rights abuses for several years, including a much-
publicized crackdown on a pro-democracy movements in 1988 and 1990.
Even after these allegations were made public, Unocal entered into several
contracts with the government of Myanmar to extract natural gas and
transport it via pipeline through the Tenasserim region of the country. The
Myanmar military provided labor and security forces and cleared roads for
the pipeline project. Unocal, in the planning stage of pipeline construction,
was warned that the Myanmar government was likely to employ forced
labor in the pipeline project. Despite complaints from villagers and human
rights groups, the project proceeded with forced labor.
In 1996, several villagers brought claims under the ATS against
Myanmar and Unocal alleging that they had been forced to work on this
project; two plaintiffs alleged that Myanmar soldiers had raped them.
5 6
Further, several villagers were forcefully relocated, and some were
executed, raped, tortured, and/or beaten. The Ninth Circuit held that the
claims against Myanmar were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. The pertinent remaining question was whether Unocal could be held
liable under some type of third-party liability, even though none of their
employees actively engaged in the forced labor or other abuses. There was
strong evidence that Unocal knew or should have known of the abuses
perpetrated by the Myanmar army in pursuit of their joint project and yet,
Unocal continued to support the project and, indirectly, the military's
actions. Several reports from human rights groups and cables from the U.S.
Embassy and the U.S. State Department 157 discussed the use of forced labor
in the project. A letter from a Unocal consultant concluded that "egregious
human rights violations have occurred, and are occurring now, in southern
Burma .... Unocal, by seeming to have accepted SLORC's [The Myanmar
ruling council's] version of events, appears at best naYve and at worst a
willing partner in the situation."158
The parties to the lawsuit contested the standard for determining third-
party liability in several court proceedings over several years. The district
court's ruling considered theories of secondary liability only in its
discussion of forced labor. Here the court relied heavily on its
interpretation of three post-WWII trials of German industrialists when it
156. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 936-40 (9th Cir. 2002).
157. Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 at 1299-1301 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
158. Id. at 1299-1300.
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concluded that "liability requires participation or cooperation in the forced
labor practices." 15 9 Although the defendants "knew that forced labor was
being utilized and ... benefited from the practice," there was no evidence
"that Unocal sought to employ forced or slave labor."160 Therefore, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Unocal.
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit first decided that the alleged
abuses of forced labor, murder, rape (as a form of torture), and torture each
violate jus cogens norms and thus are violations of the law of nations under
the ATS.161 Second, non-state actors could be held liable under the ATS for
crimes such as forced labor, which "is a modern variant of slavery to which
the law of nations attributes individual liability," 162 as well as for the
crimes of murder, rape, and torture when perpetrated in pursuit of forced
labor.163
The court split on the standard for third-person liability but was
unanimous in reversing the grant of summary judgment on the ATS
claims. Instead of the "active participation" standard applied by the district
court, the circuit court chose to apply standards of aiding and abetting
liability derived from international law precedent, specifically from
decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
court explained its decision to apply standards established in international
criminal cases to a domestic civil case:1M
International human rights law has been developed largely in the
context of criminal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings. But
what is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another
jurisdiction, and this distinction is therefore of little help in
ascertaining the standards of international human rights law.
Moreover, ... the standard for aiding and abetting in international
criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in
domestic tort law, making the choice between international and
domestic law even less crucial. 65
In a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt declined to look to
international law ("a nascent criminal law doctrine recently adopted by an
ad hoc international criminal tribunal"'166), but argued that the court should
apply "general federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint
venture, or reckless disregard."167 Judge Reinhardt reached for common
159. Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp.2d 1294 at 1310.
160. Id.
.161. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945.
162. Id. at 946.
163. Id. at 956.
164. The civil-criminal distinction is relevant to the current debate over third-party
liability under the ATS. See the discussion of the Central Bank case, infra.
165. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 949 (citations omitted).
166. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 965.
167. Id. at 963. Judge Reinhardt also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a
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law principles because "federal common law principles provide the
traditional and time-tested method of filling in the interstices and resolving
the type of ancillary legal questions presented by this case." 1
68
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit Court agreed to re-hear the case
en banc.169 The distinction between the criminal and civil contexts was a
contentious issue, as the parties disputed the meaning and application of
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, in which the Supreme Court held that
there was no civil liability for aiding and abetting under certain securities
statutes and regulations.1 70 The plaintiffs argued that because Sosa relied on
"federal common law principles," the court should rely on "federal
common law to determine aiding and abetting, joint venture, recklessness,
and agency liability." 171 Further, since "international law is part of federal
common law" aiding and abetting standards from international law are
also applicable. 172
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an amicus brief on
behalf of Unocal in which it emphasized the cautious, "vigilant
doorkeeping" side of Justice Souter's opinion in Sosa, especially because
the ATS deals with foreign affairs. DOJ argued that aiding and abetting
liability, like any standards associated with the ATS, must be 'accepted by
the civilized world' and 'defined with a specificity,' and in both respects
the norms must be 'comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms." ' 173 Moreover, the DOJ argued that Congress, not the courts,
should determine aiding and abetting liability, and since it has not done so,
there can be none. The DOJ introduced and relied heavily on the Central
Bank case, which it claimed, "is key to this case." 174 In Central Bank, the
Supreme Court concluded, "when Congress enacts a statute under which a
person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the
defendant's violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption
that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors."175 After all, the Congress did
not insert aiding and abetting language in the Act at issue (the Securities
Exchange Act) and yet they did in other statutes of the New Deal period.
"Congress instead has taken a statute-by-statute approach to civil aiding
and abetting liability." 176 Further, the Court held that even where Congress
violation must rise to the level of a jus cogens norm in the context of the law of nationsunder
the ATS.
168. Id. at 966.
169. Id. at 978.
170. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
171. Doe and Roe Plaintiffs' and Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 2, Doe v. Unocal, No.
00-56603 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2004).
172. Id. at 18.
173. Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 17, Doe v.
Unocal, No. 00-56603 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2004) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct.
2739, 2761 (2004)).
174. Id. at 8.
175. Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, Doe v.
Unocal, No. 00-56603 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2004) at 8-9. (quoting Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. at 182 (1944) (emphasis added).
176. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182 (1994).
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has established criminal aiding and abetting liability, it remains up to
Congress to establish civil liability for aiding and abetting in private causes
of action. 177 If aiding and abetting must meet the Sosa Test, as the DOJ
argued, and if there is a clear line between civil and criminal aiding and
abetting as decided in Central Bank, then the plaintiffs would have to show
that aiding and abetting liability for civil claims is universal and specific
(and perhaps obligatory). The DOJ argued that even if previous
international tribunals at Nuremberg, Arusha, and The Hague have
adopted aiding and liability for criminal acts, that does not mean that there
is universally accepted civil aiding and abetting liability. Thus, the DOJ
concluded that the holding from Central Bank, in the light of the cautious
approach to the ATS recommended in Sosa, "lead(s) to the unmistakable
conclusion that aiding and abetting liability should not be recognized
under the ATS, absent further congressional action."178
In early 2005, the Doe v. Unocal case settled out of court.179 This was a
major milestone in ATS jurisprudence because it was the first case where a
multinational corporation paid compensation to victims. However, the
settlement meant that the aiding and abetting question was left for another
day.
C. Post Sosa/Unocal Aiding and Abetting Cases
Since the Doe v. Unocal settlement, the federal courts have had several
opportunities to weigh in on the aiding and abetting liability question. The
Central Bank decision has played a prominent role in these cases. Some
courts have agreed with the DOJ that the caution of Sosa, combined with
the deference to Congress in establishing civil aiding and abetting liability
from Central Bank, precludes any aiding and abetting liability under the
ATS. For example, in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., a case that sought
damages from a plethora of multinational corporations for a wide range of
abuses suffered during Apartheid in South Africa, the court held that the
ATS does not reach aiding and abetting.180 The plaintiffs alleged
defendants' direct liability as well as secondary liability under theories of
color of law and aiding and abetting. The color of law theory was quickly
dismissed because, although the defendants may have benefited from the
177. Id. at 190-91 ("And thus, given 18 U.S.C. § 2, we would also have to hold that a civil
aiding and abetting cause of action is available for every provision of the Act. There would be
no logical stopping point to this line of reasoning: Every criminal statute passed for the benefit
of some particular class of persons would carry with it a concomitant civil damages cause of
action.").
178. Supplemental Brief for the United States., supra note 173, at 10.
179. Paul Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 63.
180. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). This wide-
ranging case involved three sets of plaintiffs with cases filed in eight different district courts.
Two sets of plaintiffs claimed that they represented a class of all those who lived in South
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apartheid regime, they did not participate in joint action with the regime.18 l
As for aiding and abetting liability, the court wrote:
Central Bank applies with special force here. Although the ATCA
points to international law for the causes of action over which it
grants jurisdiction, the ATCA presently does not provide for aider
and abettor liability, and this Court will not write it into the
statute. In refusing to do so, this Court finds this approach to be
heedful of the admonition in Sosa that Congress should be
deferred to with respect to innovative interpretations of that
statute.
8 2
However, most courts have found that aiding and abetting liability can
be sustained under the ATS.183 In In re Agent Orange, Vietnamese citizens
and a Vietnamese victims' organization brought suit against various
corporations for the damages they suffered from the use of Agent Orange
during the U.S.-Vietnamese war. 184 The plaintiffs made a series of federal
and state tort claims, including theories of aiding and abetting under the
ATS. In a lengthy opinion the court considered and quickly dismissed the
argument against aiding and abetting liability based on Central Bank.
Instead, the court concluded, "[t]here is simply no question that the ATS
provides for aiding and abetting liability." 185 The court also quoted
approvingly details of two opinions nearly contemporaneous to the
passing of the ATS that found aiding and abetting liability under
international law.'8 6 The court then derived its standard for aiding and
abetting from the rulings of the ICTY.
D. Analysis of Aiding and Abetting After Sosa
The aiding and abetting controversy in ATS cases can be dissected into
three interrelated questions with the Central Bank case cutting through
Questions two and three. This analysis will help clarify and locate the
181. Id. at 548-49.
182. Id. at 550. See also Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing
aiding and abetting claims in a case alleging human rights violations in the construction of a
natural gas extraction and liquification plant in Aceh, Indonesia).
183. See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) and In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
184. In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Ultimately the court dismissed
the case for failure to state a claim, writing, "The use of herbicides in Vietnam does not fit
within the definition of either torture or extrajudicial killing. Plaintiffs were not within the
defendants' custody or physical control, nor that of the United States, when herbicides were
used. Nor were herbicides used to intentionally inflict pain and suffering. They were used to
kill or harm plants." Id. at 112.
185. Id. at 53. The court quoted at length from an amicus brief filed by the Center for
Constitutional Rights and others that argued for aiding and abetting liability based upon
precedent in several ATS cases.
186. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795).
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holdings of the courts and the arguments of attorneys and scholars.
Question 1. Does the aiding and abetting of crimes need to meet the
Sosa Test by itself, or is it an ancillary question? If yes, go
to Question 2. If no, skip to Question 3.
Question 2. Does aiding and abetting liability, as defined in
international law, meet the Sosa test of universal and
specific (and perhaps obligatory) jurisdiction? To answer
this question, we must first ask:
(A) Is Central Bank controlling?
(i) If yes, then the question is: are there universal and
specific standards for aiding and abetting liability
in international civil law? If yes, then those
standards must be met. If no, there can be no
aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.
(ii) If no, are there universal and specific standards for
aiding and abetting in either international civil or
criminal law? If yes, then those standards must be
met. If no, there can be no aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS.
Question 3. What standards should be used to determine aiding and
abetting liability?
(A) Is Central Bank controlling?
(i) If yes, then the standards must be sought within
civil law, including the ATS itself.
(ii) If no, then a host of standards could be consulted.
The first question is whether there is a two-step process in the
application of aiding and abetting liability. In Doe v. Unocal, the plaintiffs
argued that a court must first determine whether the underlying abuse by
itself (and not the ancillary question of aiding and abetting) meets the Sosa
Test. Then, the aiding and abetting question is a second, ancillary legal
question. In other words, "[w]hat a violation of the law of nations entails
and how far liability should extend are analytically distinct questions. Sosa
decided the former without resolving the latter." 187 The DOJ, however,
187. Diskin, supra note 11, at 827.
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argued that aiding and abetting is not a secondary question: "This court
should examine: 1) whether aiding and abetting liability is broadly, if not
universally accepted, by the international community in a manner
comparable to the '18th century paradigms' [discussed in Sosa], and 2)
whether the principle, as accepted by the international community, is
defined with 'specificity."
' 188
A second and subsidiary question would be whether aiding and
abetting liability meets the Sosa Test. If Central Bank is controlling then one
would have to show that there are sufficiently universal and specific
standards for aiding and abetting in international civil law. But,
considering the under-developed nature of international civil law for
human rights abuses, 8 9 such a case most likely could not be made. If
Central Bank is not controlling, then the question is whether the standards
for aiding and abetting found in international criminal law, developed in
such places as the ad hoc criminal tribunals (Nuremburg, ICTR, ICTY, etc.)
and various treaties, such as the Rome Statute, are sufficiently universal
and specific. In the Doe case, both sides argued this point in their
supplemental briefs. Though the plaintiffs considered aiding and abetting
an ancillary question (Question 1), they claimed that the standards set in
the ad hoc criminal tribunals were sufficiently universal and specific.
Though the DOJ claimed that Central Bank was controlling (Question 2(A)),
it argued that the standards from the ad hoc criminal tribunals were not
sufficiently universal and specific. Another relevant issue concerns how
much disagreement will be tolerated before a court will be unable to hold
that a standard of aiding and abetting is universal. For instance, the ICTY's
interpretation of the actus reus standard includes "moral support," but the
Doe v. Unocal court was reluctant to include that component in their
'universal' definition of aiding and abetting 190
The third question is what standards should be applied for aiding and
abetting liability, if aiding and abetting, by itself, need not meet the Sosa
Test. If Central Bank is controlling here, the standards must be sought
within civil law, or preferably within the statute.' 91 One could argue that,
188. Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 173, at 17. See also Lynch, supra
note 11, at 787 ("Complicity in international law violations is a distinct cause of action that
must be assessed under an international law standard. However, complicity fails the
international law standard articulated by Sosa.").
189. See generally Donald Francis Donovan and Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition
of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 142 (2006).
190. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950. Cf. Presbyterian Church of the Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, at 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Therein lies the flaw in Talisman's
argument. The ubiquity of disagreement among courts and commentators regarding the
fringes of customary international legal norms is unsurprising. The existence of such
peripheral disagreement does not, however, impugn the core principles that form the
foundation of customary international legal norms-principles about which there is no
disagreement.").
191. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("But the principle
enunciated in Central Bank does not, as defendants contend, require an unequivocal
congressional mandate before allowing a claim for secondary liability. Rather, the case holds
that the scope of liability must be based on a fair reading of statutory text.").
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based upon the Attorney General's opinion of 1795, aiding and abetting
was already part of the statute. If Central Bank is not controlling and if
aiding and abetting is an ancillary question, then a host of alternatives for
aiding and abetting standards are available, including those from civil and
criminal law and from international and domestic sources. I will discuss
these below.
I argue that Congressional intent, as much as it can be ascertained, was
that aiding and abetting was part of the original meaning of the statute.
Therefore, Central Bank is not on point; the courts are not creating aiding
and abetting liability for the ATS, because it was always Congress's intent
that it would be there. This is most clearly evidenced by the 1795 Attorney
General's opinion, and can also be seen in the "ambient laws" of the time.
As Hoffman and Zaheer write, "[als is clear by the Talbot decision, the
Bradley opinion, and various other sources of early authority, aiding and
abetting liability was applicable to torts committed in violation of the law
of nations in 1789 when the ATS was passed."
192
Congressional understanding of this issue can also be inferred from the
most closely analogous statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).
Although secondary liability is not referenced in the text of the TVPA,
"every court construing this question" has held "that the TVPA can be
interpreted to allow claims for secondary liability." 193 That interpretation is
based largely on the legislative history of the TVPA. 194 Moreover, the
courts, until the Apartheid case, have generally held that there is secondary
liability under the ATS.195
E. Proposed Standards for Aiding and Abetting under the ATS
Several different standards for aiding and abetting have been
proposed. In this section I will briefly outline three proposed standards
and argue that none of them would reach the failure to investigate or
192. Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 11, at 82. Cf. Diskin, supra note 11, at 829 ("Admittedly,
Congress did not expressly use the words "aid" and "abet" in the original legislation;
however, to do so would have been superfluous given the widespread application of aiding
and abetting to all areas of the law at the time.").
193. Arar, 414 F. Supp. at 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). See also Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402
F.3d at 1157-58.
194. Id. ("Although the plain language of the statute does not expressly call for secondary
liability, its legislative history offers proof of an intention to impose it. As noted in the Senate
Report, 'a higher official need not have personally performed or ordered the abuses in order
to be held liable . . . anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly
ignored those acts is liable for them.'") (citation omitted).
195. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[Wlhile many courts have addressed situations in which corporations were
alleged to have conspired with or aided and abetted states, Talisman [the defendant] is unable
to cite a single decision in which a court held that the ATS does not recognize an action for
aiding and abetting or conspiracy."). The court also noted that "[tihe district court in Kodak v.
Kavlin, drawing heavily on Second Circuit precedent, held that 'it would be a strange tort
system that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who conspired with them to
perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power." Id. at 321 (citation omitted).
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prevent the femicides in Judrez.
1. The Furundiija Standard
Several courts have held, and some scholars have argued, that the
standards for aiding and abetting should be found in the federal common
law.196 Hoffman and Zaheer offer the most nuanced argument for this
approach. They argue that courts often rely on federal common law to
protect uniquely federal interests and to implement the intent of
Congress.197 In these situations, courts should craft federal common law
based upon federal and international precedents, which they argue, should
"be viewed as constituents of the federal common law of international
affairs."'1
98
Hoffman and Zaheer examine previous instances of the crafting of
federal common law as well as attempts to craft international customary
law in order to formulate a step-by-step strategy for choosing sources for
this "federal common law of international affairs":
Courts must look first to international and federal positive law
addressing the particular subject. If that inquiry does not yield
appropriate rules of decision, as will be the situation in the
majority of cases, then the court should next look to customary
international law as reflected by the writings of jurists,
international decisional law, treaties, and the conduct of nations. In
filling the gaps, courts may also look to generally accepted legal
principles found in the federal common law. At each phase of this
analysis, though, it will be important for U.S. courts to be
cognizant of "the needs of the interstate and international
systems," as well as "the policy of the United States, as expressed
in the ATS, to provide a remedy for violations of the law of
nations."199
Hoffman and Zaheer agree with the majority opinion in Doe III, which
draws from the Prosecutor v. Furundiija decision of the ICTY for the actus
reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting. The Doe III court wrote, "the
actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.... [A] s for the mens rea
196. Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 11, at 54.
197. Id. at 54-55 (citation omitted).
198. Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 11, at 64 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 68 (citation and quotation omitted). But see Diskin, supra note 11, at 835 (arguing
that combinations of domestic and international laws are problematic. "Either the ATS calls
for domestic law to set a standard for aiding and abetting liability, or it calls for international
law to do so. Picking and choosing from other countries' domestic legal systems would yield
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of aiding and abetting . . . what is required is actual or constructive (i.e.,
'reasonable') 'knowledge that [the accomplice's] actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime."' 200 Therefore, an aider and
abettor would be one who "gives some sort of assistance and support with
the knowledge however that torture is being practiced .... ,"
201
2. The Common Law of Torts Approach
In his concurrence in Doe III, Judge Reinhardt recommends three
theories of liability for aiding and abetting derived from the common law
of torts: joint venture, agency, and recklessness.20 2 This represents perhaps
the widest definition of third-party liability under the ATS.
Diskin agrees with Judge Reinhardt that aiding and abetting standards
should be found in domestic law, but he disagrees with the use of the
federal common law principles of joint venture, agency, and reckless
disregard. Instead, Diskin prefers the standards found in section 876(a) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 20 3 The Restatement approach has a
stricter scienter requirement than common law tort principles. A person
would be liable under section 876 if he:
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
200. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundlija,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 1 235 (December 10, 1998)). See also
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment (June 12,
2002); In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24. But see, Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at
970 (Reinhardt, J. concurring) (expressing reservations at the adoption of the Furund~ija
standard for aiding and abetting, especially the "moral support" portion of actus reus.).
201. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1 252.
202. The majority also expressed support for these standards in a footnote: "Joint venture,
agency, negligence, and recklessness may, like aiding and abetting, be viable theories on the
specific facts of this ATCA case. Moreover, on the facts of other ATCA cases, joint venture,
agency, negligence, or recklessness may in fact be more appropriate theories than aiding and
abetting." Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947 n.20. See also Christensen, supra note 11, at 1256 (the
question of "whether the conduct of the state actor can be imputed to the multinational
corporation for tort liability purposes... can be answered by well-established tort and agency
law principles; after all, it is the Alien Tort Statute.").
203. This approach was taken by the district court in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No.
96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
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constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.2°4
Diskin argues that application of section 876's requirements of
"knowledge and substantial assistance" would allay the fears of
multinational corporations that they would be held strictly liable for
overseas investments. 205 Under Judge Reinhardt's common law standard,
according to Diskin, a multinational corporation could be held accountable
even where "a corporation could not be expected to know that its
investment would cause human rights violations." 2 6 Diskin argues that the
section 876 standard is similar in substance to the ICTY's Furundiija
decision,207 but that it is more appropriate for ATS cases from an "historical
perspective." 2 8  If courts use the international tribunal standards
(established almost two centuries after the ATS), they would be claiming
"either the ATS did not allow for aiding and abetting liability until
standards were agreed upon by the international community; or
historically, the ATS allowed aiding and abetting liability, but international
law standards of criminal aiding and abetting displaced the domestic law
standards." 209
F. Aiding and Abetting in the Judrez Situation
In the Ju~rez situation the failure to prevent the femicides would most
likely not be actionable under any of the three proposed aiding and
abetting standards -the Furundiija standard, the Restatement, or standard
common law tort principles. If one could show that the government
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
205. Id. at 833.
206. Diskin, supra note 11, at 831.
207. Several authorities argue that Section 876 standards mirror, in relevant respects, the
Furundiija standards. E.g., Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951 ("At least with respect to assistance
and encouragement, this standard is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting under
domestic tort law.") and Hoffman and Zaheer, supra note 11, at 80 (concluding that domestic
and international standards for aiding and abetting "are the same in all substantive
respects.").
208. Diskin, supra note 11, at 830.
209. Id. at 830 (internal citation omitted). I agree with Diskin's reasoning on the first
Point-that Congress did not intend that the courts wait until international tribunals created
aiding and abetting standards. After all, Attorney General Bradford's opinion assumes that
they are there. But Diskin's second point, that the international standards can replace pre-
existing domestic standards, begs two questions. First, if, as Diskin concedes, aiding and
abetting is a distinct legal question from substantive jurisdiction, then should ancillary legal
questions such as forum non conveniens, exhaustion of domestic remedies, statute of
limitations, and equitable tolling also evolve over time just as the Sosa Court has said that the
law of nations would evolve? Second, Diskin appears to be suggesting that we seek
international standards such as customary law for substantive claims under the ATS, but that
on the all-important question of aiding and abetting liability (or other ancillary questions), we
seal off international law. This not only appears to neglect the important role that
international law can play in the crafting of federal common law but is somewhat extreme
especially considering that the core area of law that we are exploring, namely, violations of
the law of nations, often do not have a corollary in U.S. civil law.
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authorities "perceived substantial risk" that was "closely and immediately
tied to" one of the victims, then one might reach an opposite conclusion.210
However, the failure to take specific operational steps, such as the
installation of more lighting or the provision of more training on sex
crimes, would be too attenuated to qualify as aiding and abetting under
any of the theories.
211
Creating a theory of aiding and abetting liability for the failure to
provide due diligence in the investigations is more complicated. Using the
Furundiija definition for aiding and abetting ("knowing practical assistance
or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime"), one could argue that the failure to investigate the murders has had
a substantial effect on subsequent crimes, and the authorities should have
known that an improper or cursory investigation would contribute to the
crimes. According to the ICTY, the actus reus of aiding and abetting can
occur before, during, or after the commission of a crime,212 and it includes
actions as well as omissions.213 Further, the aider and abettor need not
share "the mens rea of the principal, but it must be shown that the aider and
abettor was aware of the relevant mens rea on the part of the principal." 214
The Mexican authorities may not have desired that the women be tortured
and killed. They may have had other motives or pressures that kept them
from adequately investigating or preventing the femicides, but they were
most likely aware of the mens rea of the perpetrator. Further, unlike
conspiracy, "no proof is required of the existence of a common concerted
plan, lef alone of the pre-existence of such a plan."215
The ICTY has ruled that the mens rea of aiding and abetting must be
prior or simultaneous to the act of the principal. 216 In a case regarding the
reburial of victims in mass graves from the Srebrenica massacre, the ICTY
held that the reburial was not foreseeable at the time of the massacre, and
thus, it could only be characterized "as ex post facto aiding and abetting." 217
The ICTY further explained that "[i]t is required for ex post facto aiding and
abetting that at the time of the planning, preparation or execution of the
210. See Medina v. Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992).
211. See Id. ("[Gliven the fact that reckless intent involves an unreasonable disregard of a
known great risk rather than intent to cause a particularized harm, the defendant's reckless
conduct may be considered to be directed toward the plaintiff if the plaintiff is closely and
immediately tied to the perceived substantial risk.").
212. Prosecutor v. Blaki, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment at the Appeals Chamber, 48
July 29, 2004).
213. Id. 47.
214. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment at the Appeals Chamber,
162 (March 24, 2000).
215. Prosecutor v. Tadk, Case No. IT-94-1A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 229
(July 15, 1999).
216. The ICTY Statute holds that an individual can be held criminally responsible when
he or she "aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime." Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 7 (1), S.C. Res. 827, 25 May
1993.
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crime, a prior agreement exists between the principal and the person who
subsequently aids and abets in the commission of the crime." 218 Such a
prior agreement between the perpetrators and the authorities is not readily
found in the Judrez situation. At most, one could show that the authorities
foresaw that their actions and/or inactions would lead to further murders.
This, however, would be best discussed under the common law notion of
reckless disregard, or as I discuss below, as acquiescence to torture.
Judge Reinhardt's three common law principles for aiding and abetting
would not be applicable to the Juirez femicides either, as they would
require evidence of a stronger relationship between the police force and the
perpetrators of specific crimes. Specifically, joint venture requires evidence
of "an agreement, express or implied," "a community of pecuniary
interest" or "an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise,
which gives an equal right of control." 219 An agency relationship requires a
"decision to create or participate in an agency relationship in anticipation
of certain benefits." 220 There is no evidence of either relationship between
the police force and the perpetrators of the Judrez murders.
Recklessness is a more appropriate theory for the Judrez situation. 221
Recklessness is defined in the U.S. Model Penal Code as:
when [a person] consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation.22
Recklessness has rarely been used in a third-party liability context. When it
has, it appears to be rooted in the context of a special relationship between
the perpetrator and the third party. Judge Reinhardt explained that:
The common law principle of recklessness has typically been
applied to acts by a defendant that directly cause harm to a
plaintiff. Nevertheless, I see no reason why the general principle
218. Id. 731.
219. Giverny Gardens Limited Partnership v. Columbia Housing Partners Limited
Partnership, 147 F. App'x 443, 450 (6th Cir. 2005).
220. Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised Prospectus for a Third Restatement of Agency, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1998).
221. Cf. Diskin, supra note 11, at 831 ("The reckless disregard standard has some merit
because it better approximates criminal standards of culpability. A showing of reckless
disregard might go some way toward proving that a corporation acted with knowledge that it
would cause a violation of international law. The wisest application of the reckless disregard
standard, however, is to incorporate it into section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
requirement that a defendant be knowledgeable that his conduct will effectuate a tortious
result. Under this approach, a showing of reckless disregard, while not determinative of
liability, may provide strong circumstantial evidence of intent.") (footnote omitted).
222. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Unofficial Draft 1962).
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that liability arises for one party's conscious disregard of
unreasonable risks to another should not apply when a defendant
consciously disregards the risks that arise from its decision to use
the services of an entity that it knows or ought to know is likely to
cause harm to another party.3
Recklessness is also used as a form of third-party liability in special
relationships, such as agency relationships in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases 224 and
in command responsibility cases. 225 The facts of the Judrez situation, in
contrast, do not evince a joint enterprise or other type of special
relationship between the authorities and the perpetrators.
226
Nonetheless, where the state has a special duty to protect individuals
but fails to act to prevent a foreseeable risk, it could be held liable as a third
party. For instance, "[p]rison officials have a duty under the 8th and 14th
amendments to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners." 227 This duty appears to stem from a special relationship
between the state and the prisoners, created by the confinement and the
prisoners' vulnerability that inevitably results from the prison context.228 If
one could establish such a special duty, then general principles for reckless
disregard would apply. The liability of the third party would arise from the
reckless disregard of a specific risk, not from the intention to harm. 229 Since
liability is tied to the disregard of a risk, the failure to act does not require a
223. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 975 (Reinhardt concurring) (referring to the alleged joint
venture between Unocal and the Myanmar government). Cf. Angela A. Barkin, Corporate
America - Making a Killing: An Analysis of Why it is Appropriate to Hold American Corporations
Who Fund Terrorist Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism, 40 CAL. W. L. REV.
169, 180 (2003) ("Reckless disregard, on the other hand, provides a strong basis for holding the
American corporations liable for aiding and abetting terrorism."); Christensen, supra note 11,
at 1267-68 ("[Ilf an MNC recklessly fails to monitor or oversee those agents that it knows or
should know are committing jus cogens violations, the MNC can and should be held liable.
MNCs cannot hide behind willful blindness.").
224. E.g., Medina v. Denver, 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
225. See Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens
Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 57, 75 (2004) ("Willful
blindness will therefore be a strong indication of at least dolus eventualis or of recklessness and
night found liability in cases where those forms of fault would suffice to establish
accountability. Willful blindness is particularly relevant in the case of command
responsibility.") (footnote omitted).
226. Again, I am assuming that complicity would not be established between the
authorities and the perpetrators of the femicides. Many scholars and activists do not share this
assumption. See Part I, supra.
227. Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398-99 (1979).
228. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) ("Having incarcerated 'persons [with] demonstrated
proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,' having stripped them of
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the
government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.") (internal
citations omitted).
229. Medina v. Denver, 960 F.2d at 1496 ("reckless intent involves disregard of a particular
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direct relationship with the victim, as long as the victim is "closely and
immediately tied to the perceived substantial risk." 230
In the Juarez situation, the special relationship leading to a duty to act
does not derive from agency theory or command responsibility, but from
the state's duty to protect its citizens from torture.231 Under the CAT,
"[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction." 232 Additionally, each state is required to "ensure that its
competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation,
wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has
been committed." 233 Thus, since the CAT outlines special duties for the
state to prevent and investigate torture, failure to do so could serve as a
form of actus reus, with recklessness serving as a type of mens rea. I
develop this formulation in the next section as "acquiescence to torture."
IV. ACQUIESCENCE TO TORTURE AS
THIRD PERSON LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
This section proposes acquiescence to torture as an innovative way to
establish third-party liability under the ATS. Acquiescence to torture
would be a useful addition to ATS jurisprudence because it extends
liability under the ATS to cover failure to prevent and investigate torture.
Even if the courts ultimately accept the argument from the DOJ's Unocal
brief that Central Bank is "key" and thus remove aiding and abetting
liability from the scope of the ATS, some form of third-party liability,
primary liability for secondary actors, would remain.
A. The Aftermath of Central Bank and Primary Liability for Secondary
Actors
In Unocal, the DOJ emphasized the central finding of Central Bank: that
the Court refused to create a right of private action for aiding and abetting
liability for securities fraud under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
Overlooked almost entirely in the arguments surrounding the importance
of the Central Bank decision for the ATS context is that the case does not
eliminate all liability for secondary actors. The Court's opinion ends with
the reminder that, although secondary liability may be ruled out under the
1934 Act, secondary actors may still face liability for primary violations of
the Act.
234
230. Medina v. Denver, 960 F.2d at 1496.
231. Mexico ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1987. See Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal Human
Rights Treaties, as of 9 June 2004, at 7, available at www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
232. CAT, supra note 12, art. 2(1).
233. CAT, supra note 12, art. 12(1).
234. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 ("The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability
does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability
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In the aftermath of Central Bank, there has been a great deal of
controversy about what behavior of secondary actors meets the standards
for primary liability in the securities context. Some courts have embraced a
"bright line"235 test where the secondary actor must have actually created
the statement upon which "the purchaser or seller of securities relies." 236
Other courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit, have argued for a substantial
participation test where a secondary actor may be primarily liable even if
they did not make the statements but "played a significant role in drafting
and editing" documents that contained the statements.237  Many
commentators have argued that the more liberal substantial participation
test effectively eviscerates the Central Bank holding by merely re-labeling
secondary violators as primary violators. In this reading, the substantial
participation test is merely aiding and abetting in poor disguise.
238
The aftermath of Central Bank is instructive for the ATS context. If the
courts strip secondary liability from the ATS, then, as in securities law after
Central Bank, primary liability of secondary actors would remain. However,
the courts would be wary of theories of primary liability that would
attempt an end run around the prohibition of aiding and abetting.
Therefore, the primary liability of secondary actors should be clearly
ensconced in the statute, which for the ATS means that it should be clearly
part of the law of nations. For example, command responsibility is so well
ensconced in international and domestic law that it would most likely
remain. In a like manner, acquiescence to torture is part of the very
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.").
235. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 156 F. App'x 413, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Shapiro v.
Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
236. Filler, 156 F. App'x at 415 (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174
(2nd Cir. 1998)).
237. In re Software Toolworks, Inc. v. PaineWebber Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994). See also Tracy A. Nichols & Stephen P. Warren, Aiding and Abetting Liability under
Section 10(G): Can Plaintiffs "Scheme" a Way around Central Bank under Subsections (a) and
(c) of Rule 10b-5?, www.hklaw.com/content/whitepapers/aidingandabetting.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2007) (discussing district court holdings concerning aiding and abetting liability in
securities misstatement cases); Celia R. Taylor Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of
Denver after Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REV. 367 (2006) (criticizing holding in Central
Bank and proposing a new judicial approach to aiding and abetting liability).
238. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Allegations of 'assisting,'
participating in,' 'complicity in' and similar synonyms used throughout the complaint all fall
within the prohibitive bar of Central Bank."). See also Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of
Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud
and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 667, 670 (2004) ("Although certain forms of
participation by secondary actors may [constitute] participation . . .they cannot support a
primary claim without conflicting with the test of Section 10(G)."). But see Scott Siamas,
Primary Securities Fraud Liability for Secondary Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the
Wake of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 915 (2004)
("'Participation' . . . infers knowing involvement in a fraudulent activity. Such a distinction
should be the standard for the imposition of liability on a secondary actor.").
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definition of torture accepted as the law of nations for ATS purposes,239 so
courts would uphold it even if aiding and abetting were eliminated.
B. International Definitions of Torture
Article 1 of the CAT contains the authoritative international definition
of torture. As of 2004, 136 countries had approved the CAT;240 dozens of
domestic and international cases reference it, and its definition of torture
has been labeled "customary international law." 241 The CAT defines torture
as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
242
Under the CAT state parties have the affirmative duties, inter alia, to
"prevent acts of torture" 243 and "ensure that its competent authorities
proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation." 244 Nor can states "expel,
return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." 245
The international definition of torture has four main aspects: the
severity of the abuse, intentionality in the commission of the act, the
objective of the action,246 and official involvement of some type. 247 The
239. E.g., Aldana v. Del Monte, 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) ("When courts seek to
define torture in international law, they often look to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment... Accordingly, we, for ATA
purposes, too look to the Convention when deciding what constitutes torture according to the
laws of nations."). In addition, the ICTY treated the CAT as part of customary international
law. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, 459 (ICTY 1998) ("It may ... be said that the
definition of torture contained in the Torture Convention includes the definitions contained in
both the Declaration on Torture and the Inter-American Convention and this reflects a
consensus which the Trial Chamber considers to be representative of customary international
law.").
240. CAT, supra note 12.
241. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY 1998).
242. CAT, supra note 12, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
243. Id. art. 2(1).
244. Id. art. 12.
245. Id. art. 3(1).
246. Several courts and commentators have noted that the clause beginning "for such
purposes" was not intended to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T,
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extent of official involvement is the key question in my analysis. It is clear
from the definition that torture need not be directly perpetrated by the
public official but could be at the "instigation of" or with the "the consent
or acquiescence" of an official.248 The drafting history of the CAT reinforces
this conclusion. The CAT grew out of the UN Declaration on Torture,
which defined torture without the "consent or acquiescence" language.249
The addition of this language clearly marked an additional area of state
responsibility for third party liability. Further, the terms "consent" and
"acquiescence" were not meant to be synonymous: acquiescence refers to a
less overt form of approval of torture than consent. 250
During the drafting of the CAT, the French "considered that the
definition of the act of torture should be a definition of the intrinsic nature
of the act of torture itself, irrespective of the status of the perpetrator," 251
but most states held that the definition should only apply to actions
imputing responsibility on state actors. As two drafters of the CAT write,
"the Convention does not deal with cases of ill-treatment which occur in an
exclusively non-governmental setting. It only relates to practices which
occur under some sort of responsibility public officials or other persons
acting in an official capacity." 252 The drafting history is not clear as to what
extent the definition applies to the failure to prevent or investigate private
acts of torture. Is the act only considered torture when it is directly
470 (ICTY 1998) ("The use of the words 'for such purposes' in the customary definition of
torture, indicates that the various listed purposes do not constitute an exhaustive list, and
should be regarded as merely representative."). Nevertheless, violence against women, such
as the femicides, is often perpetrated with the intent to intimidate or coerce, or out of
discrimination against women. See, e.g., Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Convention Against
Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
895, 928 (2000) ("[Diomestic violence victims ... fit within the enumerated Article 1 purposes
of punishment, intimidation, coercion, and discrimination of any kind; that is, domestic
violence is widely recognized as a situation in which the man seeks to dominate and control
the woman."); Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67
ALB. L. REV. 371, 406-07 (2003) (claiming that domestic violence, a form of "private torture,"
resembles "official torture," in that both share the same "general purpose," viz., "the
attainment of control.").
247. Anthony Cullen, Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of the Concept
Employed by the European Court of Human Rights, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 29, 32 (2003).
248. "Instigation" and "consent or acquiescence" also appear in CAT's Article 16
discussing states' responsibilities to prevent torture as well as in art. 4 of the CAT Optional
Protocol discussing state visits. See CAT, supra note 12, arts. 4, 16.
249. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, Annex, 30
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34), U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/G/h-comp38.htm.
250. Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the Convention Against
Torture: When has a Government Acquiesced in the Torture of its Citizens? 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585,
598 (2005) ("The definitions of consent and acquiescence, as intended by the drafters of the
Convention, must necessarily differ; if they did not, there would be no reason to include them
both. The dictionary definition of consent is 'to give assent, as to the proposal of another."').
251. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 45 (1988).
252. Id. at 1.
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perpetrated by a member of the state apparatus, or could it be a member of
the state apparatus failing to investigate or prevent an act by a private
individual?253 J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, who were among the
drafters of the CAT, saw pre-existing state responsibility for investigating
and preventing private acts of torture. "If torture is committed without any
involvement of the authorities, but as a criminal act by private persons, it
can be expected that the normal machinery of justice will operate and that
prosecution and punishment will follow under the normal conditions of
the domestic legal system." 254 Their gloss on Article 1, though, is not
conclusive as to the meaning of the "consent or acquiescence" language.
They write:
It could be that the torture is not directly connected with any
public authority but that the authorities have hired him to help
gather information or have at least accepted or tolerated his act. All
such situations where the responsibility of the authorities is
somehow engaged are supposed to be covered by the rather wide
phrase appearing in article 1.255
However, the Special Rapporteur on Torture of the UN Commission on
Human Rights wrote that the "consent or acquiescence" language "makes
the State responsible for acts committed by private individuals which it did
not prevent from occurring or, if need be, for which it did not provide
appropriate remedies." 256 Several scholars also argue for a liberal reading
of the "consent or acquiescence" language to cover underlying acts by
private individuals.257
253. Cf. In re S-V-, 22 1 & N Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000) (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
Schmidt, P., Chairman) (noting that the meaning of the c6nsent or acquiescence clause "is not
transparent.").
254. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 251, at 119-20.
255. Id. at 120.
256. The Special Rapporteur on Torture, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of
Torture and Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, 73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.1
(Nov. 14, 2000).
257. See, e.g., Samuel L. David, Foul Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretations of the Non-
Refoulement Obligation under the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 769,
783-89 (2003) (arguing that the CAT "commands" an "analytic stance [that] militates for an
expansive construction of 'other persons acting in an official capacity' given contemporary
trends in international relations and the nature of state power."); Dawn J. Miller, Holding
States to Their Convention Obligations: The United Nations Convention AgainstTorture and the Need
for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 304 (2003) (" [W]here torture
occurred at the hands of a private group and was reported to authorities, but the torture was
not prevented or the torturer was not punished, the state would be seen to "acquiesce" in the
torture."); David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (1999) ("Persons who are in danger of being subjected to
intentionally inflicted pain by private actors are not generally protected from refoulement
under the Convention Against Torture, unless a government official consented or acquiesced
to that abuse."); and Andreea Vesa, International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of
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For further clarification, I will examine rulings from the Committee
Against Torture (hereinafter, Committee or CAT Committee), the ICTY,
and U.S. non-refoulement cases that address two questions: first, whether a
state can be held liable when it fails to investigate or prevent private acts of
torture, and second, what types of governmental actions or inactions could
lead to a finding of a failure to investigate or prevent private acts of torture.
No single case adequately addresses this issue, but a series of non-
refoulement cases from U.S. courts provide some guidance.
1. The Committee Against Torture
The Committee has had three occasions to consider torture by non-
state actors.25 8 These cases show that a state's consent or acquiescence to
private acts of torture would qualify as torture under the CAT definition.
In G.R.B. v. Sweden, a Peruvian national sought asylum because she feared
that her return would lead to torture at the hands of either the Peruvian
government or the "Sendero Luminoso" (Shining Path) guerrilla
movement.29 The Committee concluded that she was not at risk from
torture by the state.260 In its one-paragraph discussion of the potential for
torture at the hands of the Shining Path, the Committee first recalled that it
had to base its decision upon the CAT definition of torture. 261 It then
concluded without further commentary that "the issue whether the State
party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk
pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the
consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of
article 3 of the Convention." 262 Parsing this wording shows that if the
Domestic Violence 12 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 309, 335 (2004) (" [U]nder CAT, States'
Parties are not only obligated to protect citizens who are subjected to torture at the hand of
public officials, but could also be obligated to protect victims of domestic violence who are
subjected to certain grave abuses by their partners.").
258. Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Austl., Communication No. 120/1998, Comm. Against Torture, 22d
Sess., 5.2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999) (holding that torture by quasi-
state actors constitutes torture under the CAT definition because it had "effective control in
the absence of a central government."). See also David, supra note 257, at 777-78 (reading the
Elmi case as conflicting with the two concerning private actors discussed below; noting "[flor
the moment, the Committee seems to have seized upon the criterion of the existence of a
central government as the dispositive factor in evaluating whether a non-state actor can be
cQnsidered a 'person acting in an official capacity.' This reading of the case law seems to be
the only way to reconcile S. V. with Elmi."). In my analysis, I draw a more marked distinction
than David between non-state and quasi-state actors in these cases.
259. G.R.B. v. Sweden, CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (May 15, 1998).
260. Id. 7.
261. Id. 6.5.
262. Id. The BIA quotes this sentence without the "consent or acquiescence" acquiescence
clause in In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1313, and thus, gives the passage an entirely different
meaning, namely, that states are not responsible for private acts of torture. I disagree with this
reading. In S.V. v. Canada, the Committee likewise ruled against a Sri Lankan national who
was seeking asylum in Canada to avoid potential abuse by the Tamil Tigers and the Sri
Lankan government. The Committee used identical wording from G.R.B. v. Sweden. S.V. v.
Canada, 9.5, CAT/C/26/D/49/1996 (May 15, 2001).
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government had consented or acquiesced to torture by a non-governmental
entity, then this activity would constitute torture. Otherwise there would
be no need to include the "without the consent or acquiescence of the
Government" clause. But since the government in these cases did not
directly perpetrate, instigate, consent, or acquiesce to the torture, the
Committee did not attribute responsibility to any "public official or other
person acting in an official capacity."
A case involving the persecution of a Roma settlement in Yugoslavia
further reinforces this interpretation. When a Montenegrin girl reported
being raped by two young Roma, a crowd of Montenegrins conducted a
"pogrom,"263 burning property and forcing the Roma to flee.264 The police
did very little to stop the destruction and conducted a cursory
investigation. The Committee concluded that the failure to prevent the
destruction and to conduct an adequate investigation represented
violations of Articles 13 (right to present claims of torture) and 16 (duty "to
prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in article I."265). Although the majority stopped short of labeling
the incident as acquiescence to torture, two members of the Committee
filed a separate opinion concluding that the acts constituted torture, and
"the failure of the State authorities to react" constituted acquiescence to
torture.
266
2. Torture in the ICTY
The ICTY has heard many torture cases and has made an interesting
albeit overdrawn distinction between state involvement under the CAT
and in customary international humanitarian law.267 One chamber of the
ICTY, contrary to the CAT Committee, interprets consent or acquiescence
to apply only when someone in a non-private capacity perpetrates the
underlying act.
In Furundiija, the Trial Chamber first held that the definitions of
torture may differ between international humanitarian law (the laws of
war) and international human rights law. In the absence of a definition of
torture in the ICTY Statute or a settled definition in international
humanitarian law, the ICTY relied heavily, although not exclusively, on the
definition from Article 1 of the CAT, which the tribunal said was part of
customary international law.268 It then laid out the five elements of torture
263. Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, 2.1-2.12, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (Nov. 21,2002).
264. Id. 9.2-9.5.
265. CAT, supra note 12, art. 16(1).
266. Dzemafl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (individual opinion by Fernando Marifio and
Alejandro Gonzdlez Poblete).
267. In the ICTY, torture can be considered as a war crime or a crime against humanity.
ICTY Statute, supra note 207, arts. 2, 5. The tribunal has held that the definition for torture is
the same under each of these articles. E.g. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36,
Judgment, T 482 (Sept. 1, 2004).
268. Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, T 161 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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in an armed conflict, one of which is that "at least one of the persons
involved in the torture process must be a public official or must at any rate
act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a State or any other
authority-wielding entity." 269 In the Kunarac case, the trial chamber
modified the Furundiija definition based on the fact that human rights law
has traditionally been most concerned with abuses by states, while
humanitarian law concerns itself with abuses by states or private actors.
The chamber concluded that the CAT definition, especially its emphasis on
the involvement of state actors, does not necessarily apply to humanitarian
war. The chamber found reinforcement from the fact that the CAT makes
clear in its first article that its definition is "[f]or the purposes of this
convention" 270 and the CAT's preamble suggests that other treaties may
have broader definitions of torture. The Appeals chamber in Kunarac
agreed with the Trial chamber that the Furundiija definition might be valid
for customary human rights law, but torture, when committed during a
time of war, does not require the involvement of state actors.
27'
While this distinction is valid and important, the ICTY overstates the
requirement of state involvement in perpetrating torture under human
rights law as defined by the CAT. It writes, "[t]he requirement... that the
crime of torture be committed by an individual acting in an official
capacity may be considered as a limitation of the engagement of States;
they need prosecute acts of torture only when those acts are committed by 'a
public official . . . or any other person acting in a non-private capacity."'
272
Requiring that the underlying act be committed by a public official
contradicts the implications of the CAT Committee's rulings discussed
above. The CAT definition, as interpreted by the CAT Committee, suggests
that, yes, only a public official could be prosecuted for torture, but a public
official need not have directly committed the torturous acts. This has been
the interpretation in one of the most developed lines of cases on this issue:
non-refoulement cases in U.S. courts.
C. Domestic Definitions of Torture through CAT Claims in Non-
Refoulement Cases
The U.S. federal code defines torture in three places. Congress enacted
the TVPA in 1998 to codify the United States' ratification of the CAT. It
defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control." 273 The Foreign Affairs
269. Id. 162.
270. CAT, supra note 12, art. 1(1).
271. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-A, Judgment, $ 148 Oune 12, 2002).
272. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-A, 146 (quoting CAT, supra note 12, art. 1(1))
(emphasis added). Cf. Suzannah Linton, Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal
Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122, 167-69 (2001).
273. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1) (Supp. IV 2000) (emphasis added).
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Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) of 1998 was drafted in part to
comply with Article 3 of the CAT, which requires the non-refoulement of
immigrants who fear being tortured upon return to their own country. It
uses the CAT definition of torture, including the "consent or acquiescence"
language. Finally, the Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998 refers to the
definition of torture from the TVPA and adds a statement defining rape
and other forms of sexual violence as torture. The TVPA and CAT
definitions contain pertinent distinctions for third-party liability, discussed
below. In this section I concentrate on the definition of acquiescence as
defined by FARRA in non-refoulement cases.
1. The Controversy Over Willful Blindness and Willful Acceptance
Standards
President Reagan transmitted the CAT to the Senate with a series of
understandings that critics claimed would undermine its very purpose.
One of these was that the United States would interpret acquiescence to
require "that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture,
have knowledge of such 'activity." 274 The Senate balked at these
understandings and in 1990 the Bush I administration sent a new list of
understandings for the ratification of CAT. This time the Senate substituted
the word "knowledge" with the word "awareness" in the definition of
acquiescence. The Senate ultimately accepted most of President Bush's
recommendations. The regulations clarify what constitutes acquiescence of
a public official: "the public official, prior to the activity constituting
torture, [must] have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or
her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity."
275
Whether willful blindness or willful acceptance comports better with
acquiescence to torture has been a central issue in non-refoulement cases.
This distinction has hinged upon the Senate's substitution of "knowledge"
with "awareness." In In Re S-V-, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
defined acquiescence as willful acceptance of torture.276 S-V-, a Colombian
national, came to the United States as a Legal Permanent Resident in 1981,
but was convicted of grand theft, resisting arrest and driving with a
suspended license in 1998.277 S-V- argued that if he returned to Colombia,
certain guerilla groups would kidnap and torture him because he had
family in the United States and did not speak Spanish correctly.278 For relief
under CAT, S-V- had to show that the guerillas were operating with the
consent or acquiescence of governmental officials. The BIA cited the
definition of acquiescence from 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) 279 and noted that the
274. S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, at 15 (emphasis added).
275. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2006) (emphasis added).
276. In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1312.
277. Id. at 1307.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1311-12 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7), which states that "[a]cquiescence of a
public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have
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Senate had replaced the word "knowledge" with the word "awareness" in
the definition of acquiescence. It noted further that "[tihe purpose of this
condition is to make it clear that both actual knowledge and 'willful
blindness' fall within the definition of the term 'acquiescence."'
280
Nevertheless, the BIA stressed that the Senate report emphasized that
torture "includes only acts that occur in the context of governmental
authority." 281 The BIA effectively ignored the stated definition of
acquiescence and limited the definition of torture to those situations where
the government willfully accepted torture or had effective control.282 From
this willful acceptance standard, the BIA concluded, "that a government's
inability to control a group ought not lead to the conclusion that the
government acquiesced to the group's activities." 283 The Chairman of the
BIA and two other board members dissented in part and another board
member, Rosenberg, wrote that the definition in 8 C.F.R. § 2098.18(a)
included "both actual knowledge and 'willful blindness"' and thus, "[tihe
interpretation does not expressly exempt actions by entities outside a
government's control."
284
The Attorney General gave his imprimatur to the willful acceptance
standard from In Re S-V- in the combined case of In re Y-L-, In re A-G-, In re
R-S-R- (from Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, respectively).285
Each of the three respondents was convicted, inter alia, of either cocaine
possession or trafficking -"particularly serious crimes"-so the Attorney
General ruled that they were ineligible for withholding of removal.286 Each
claimed that their removal should be deferred because they would more
likely than not be tortured upon removal.287 The Attorney General, citing
the BIA's ruling in In re S-V-, held that "willful acceptance" and not
"willful blindness" was the appropriate standard for determining
acquiescence. 28 8 They were each denied deferral.
A-G-'s case is illustrative. In order to receive reduced prison time, A-G-
helped the federal authorities gather evidence against another Jamaican
man, K-C-. 289 K-C- and several of his associates threatened A-G-'s life if he
returned to Jamaica. The Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed with A-G-'s claim
that the Jamaican authorities were complicit because they were unable or
refused to control the private actors who threatened A-G-. 290 The IJ made
this finding based on corruption in the Jamaican police and a perceived
close relationship between drug dealers and police officers. The BIA
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to
prevent such activity.").
280. Id. at 1312 (citing S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 6 (1990)).
281. In re S-V-, 22 I. &. N. Dec. at 1312. (citing S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988)).
282. In re S-V-, 22 1. &. N. Dec. at 1312.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1318.
285. In re Y-L-, In re A-G-, In re R-S-R-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 270 (BIA 2002).
286. Id. at 270.
287. Id. at 279.
288. Id. at 283.
289. Id. at 281.
290. Id. at 282.
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upheld the IJ's ruling. Attorney General Ashcroft wrote: "Incredibly, the
BIA found this reasoning both 'thorough' and correct. I do not agree."
291
He cited a State Department report finding that the Jamaican government
may commit some abuses, but that in general, civilian authorities
controlled the security forces.292 Therefore, there is no evidence that the
Jamaican authorities "would approve or 'willfully accept' atrocities."
293
Most circuit courts have since overruled the willful acceptance
standard from In re S-V- in favor of the willful blindness standard.294 In
Zheng v. Ashcroft,295 the Ninth Circuit considered the case of a 16-year old
Chinese boy whose parents had already emigrated to the U.S. when he was
smuggled into Guam and captured by the government. He identified and
testified against the smugglers, leading to a series of threats against him. In
his subsequent removal hearing, Zheng stated that he feared that if he
returned to China, he would face torture or death at the hands of the
smugglers, and that the Chinese government would not protect him
because the smugglers had connections among government officials.296 The
IJ granted Zheng's withholding of removal under CAT, holding that the
government acquiesced in the smuggler's conduct. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) appealed to the BIA, which followed the
willful acceptance standard of In re S-V- and ordered Zheng removed to
China. In its decision, the Board approvingly quoted the INS argument:
Even if some Chinese police take bribes to let refugees pass
through checkpoints, this is a purely non-violent and relatively
benign offense[.] It does not raise any inference whatsoever that
such bribe-takers would be amenable to violence; i.e., that with
prior knowledge they would allow the commission of acts of ...
torture.2
97
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA's analysis and ruled based
upon Congressional intent that willful blindness was the more appropriate
standard, and all the boy had to show was that a government official had
"awareness of such activity and thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity." 298 Thus, "[t]o the
extent that decisions such as Matter of S-V- and In re Y-L, A-G, R-S-R-,
require actual knowledge and 'willful[] accept[ance]' - contrary to clear
congressional intent to require only awareness - we disapprove of those
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 283.
294. See discussion of cases, infra. But see Freshwater, supra note 250, at 599 n.91 (arguing
that some courts not only ignore the willful blindness standard of the Senate, but also ignore
the acquiescence part of the torture definition and require active governmental involvement in
torture).
295. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
296. Id. at 1190.
297. Id. at 1192.
298. Id. at 1194 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2002)).
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decisions." 299 The court vacated the BIA's decision and ordered a new
hearing for Zheng.
Other circuits have also adopted the willful blindness standard, 300 but
since FARRA was enacted only in 1998, the case law on acquiescence to
torture is still in its early stages. Courts tend to defer to BIA decisions
because of its position as the Attorney General's designee in deportation
decisions, 3 1 and the IJ's findings of fact are conclusive unless clearly
erroneous.30 2 Nonetheless, some general principles are beginning to
emerge.
2. Systematic Deficiencies in the Government's Response to Private
Torture
Patricia Freshwater has analyzed many of these cases and derived
three factors to determine whether a state has acquiesced to torture. They
are: 1) "Do systematic deficiencies in the government's response to private
torture exist?"; 2) "Are government officials involved in the torture?" and;
3) "Is the de jure government the de facto government?" 3 3 I confine my
analysis to the first factor because the third is not relevant to the Mexican
situation, and U.S. courts have yet to consider the second a decisive
factor. 304
First, it is clear from non-refoulement cases that the government must
take appropriate steps to prevent acts of torture committed by non-state
actors. In Azanor v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit, considering whether female
genital mutilation constituted torture, held that withholding of removal
under CAT was appropriate where the petitioner showed the likelihood of
torture while in the custody or control of a private, as opposed to
299. Id. at 1196. See also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that reporting persecution by private parties to governmental authorities is not a prerequisite
for relief); Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Today we explicitly hold that
the IJ's reliance on In Re S-V was manifestly contrary to the law.").
300. E.g., Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[Tiorture requires only
that government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach
their legal responsibility to prevent it.")
301. Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2004).
302. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2005) ("[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.").
303. Freshwater, supra note 250, at 601-06.
304. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 251, at 119 ("Only in exceptional cases should it
therefore be possible to conclude that the infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public
official would not constitute torture as meant in the definition on the ground that he acted for
purely private reasons."). But see Khan v. Gonzales, 164 F. App'x 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that even when the actions are perpetrated by a member of parliament it must be
shown that the torture occurred "while acting in his official capacity as a member of
parliament or at the instigation or acquiescence of another public official acting in an official
capacity."); Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 525 (M.D.Pa. 2003) ("Even if a substantial
number of government officials are corrupt, we cannot conclude that others in the
government are failing to resist such conduct.").
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governmental, party.305 Similarly, in Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed with an IJ decision that withholding of removal under
CAT required a showing that torture would be committed by a
governmental party.
30 6
Second, there is no strict liability for acquiescence to torture. A state
must either have actual knowledge of, or be willfully blind to torture. In
Adeniyi v. Bureau of Immigration, the Second Circuit threw out a CAT
challenge because there was no evidence that the state of Nigeria was
aware that a family member would punish a man for his religious beliefs.
The court held that failure to report torture can undermine a claim of
government acquiescence. 307 However, the failure to report the torture is
not fatal to an acquiescence claim: "It is enough that public officials could
have inferred the alleged torture was taking place, remained willfully blind
to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to
oppose it."308 The authorities, though, must be aware of the specific
activities that constitute torture.
30 9
Third, if the state is actively fighting the perpetrators or taking all
reasonable steps to investigate the abuses, they are less likely to be
acquiescing to torture. For example, the Third Circuit held that
governmental acquiescence could not be found when the government of
Uganda was "in continuous opposition" to the Lord's Resistance Army,
which allegedly perpetrated acts of torture.310 If a government reacts in a
timely manner and takes steps to investigate, even if it does not solve the
crime, then it is less likely to be acquiescing. Here Menjivar v. Gonzales is
instructive.311 Sandra Menjivar fled El Salvador to escape a gang member
who was angered when she shunned his request to be his girlfriend.312 The
gang member allegedly shot at but missed Menjivar, but killed her
grandmother and paralyzed her niece.313 The police investigated, and the
gang member reportedly fled to Honduras but eventually returned to El
Salvador. 314 In fear Menjivar fled to the United States.315 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the IJ and BIA ruling denying her CAT claim, noting that the
305. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004).
306. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the IJ's
interpretation of the CAT was inconsistent with the plain language of the governing
regulations).
307. Adeniyi v. Bureau of Immigration, 157 F. App'x 461, 465 (2d Cir. 2005) ("There is no
indication in the record that any authorities were aware of what was happening in Famola's
village ... [H]is failure to report any of his uncle's actions to the authorities undermines his
claim that they would not take any action to protect him."). Cf. Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406
F.3d 1187, 1192 (l0th Cir. 2005) (holding that the respondent failed to show a compelling
connection between a private creditor to whom they owed debt and the Honduran
government).
308. Ornelas-Chavez, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21311, at 22.
309. See Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 241.
310. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 183 (3d Cir. 2003).
311. Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005).
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police responded as quickly as possible and that they did investigate the
shooting: "the government responded to the report of [the gangmember's]
criminal activity, and acted upon the information that Menjivar and other
witnesses provided." 3 6  Menjivar produced newspaper articles
documenting the police's difficulty in tackling the gang problem in El
Salvador, but the court stated that such difficulties were "insufficient to
compel a finding of willful blindness toward the torture of citizens by third
parties."
317
Operational steps to prevent acts of torture also show that the state has
not acquiesced to torture. In Ferry v. Gonzales, the government had
informed the petitioner that his name was on a paramilitary group's death
list and had given him and his father "financial assistance to prevent
torture" in the form of a security grant that they used to "secure the front
door of their home."
318
The factual pattern in Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft,319 with its close
involvement of the authorities, is instructive for the Jufrez situation. The
petitioner and other Honduran citizens formed a land cooperative to
protect their rights during a land dispute, and five landlords attempted to
remove them. After being driven off the land and having their homes
burned down, the cooperative returned and rebuilt their homes. An officer
of the cooperative was killed, and one of their guards was gunned down at
a public meeting. The BIA concluded that "even if the landlords had
general support in some sectors of the Honduran government, that support
alone did not establish that Honduran officials would acquiesce in his
torture."320 Ontunez challenged this finding, reiterating the governmental
connections in his story, including a police escort to the assassination, the
fact that the police never apprehended the landlords for the assassination,
the police clearing of the cooperative, "and the Honduran government's
policy of dislodging squatters." 321 Despite these facts, the court affirmed
the BIA's decision, noting that the police eventually arrested and convicted
an alleged assassin, and that it was understandable that the landlords were
not prosecuted because they denied complicity in the assassination. 322 The
court explained that "reasonable factfinders could be unpersuaded that the
landlords were motivated by the political aspects of Ontunez's struggle,"
and therefore it was inappropriate to overturn the BIA's decision.
323
Fourth, several non-refoulement cases have suggested that a state's
failure to adequately investigate or prevent domestic violence or sexual
violence qualifies as acquiescence to torture. In Ali v. Reno, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the BIA's decision that the Danish police had not acquiesced in a
case of domestic violence where police investigated and arrested the family
316. Id. at 922.
317. Id. at 923.
318. 457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006).
319. 303 F.3d. 341 (5th Cir. 2002).
320. Id. at 354..
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 352.
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members until they were asked by the applicant not to punish them.324
Nevertheless, the court suggested that CAT relief might be appropriate
where authorities ignore or consent to severe domestic violence.
325
In Re D-K- continued this line of reasoning in granting a CAT claim to a
Congolese woman who suffered extreme forms of domestic violence,
including rape by her husband.326 D-K- claimed that the government
"maintained a policy of willful blindness because it was aware of the
prevalence of domestic violence in its country, yet did not act upon that
knowledge."
327
Although the courts did not find for the appellants in many of these
cases, it is becoming clear what kinds of questions the courts ask to
determine if the government "would turn a blind eye to torture."
328
General government corruption and under-funding of law enforcement
will most likely not count as acquiescence to torture.329 Likewise, the failure
to solve crimes is not sufficient to show government acquiescence. But
failure to respond in a timely fashion, to follow up on leads, and to take
operational steps to prevent torture all contribute to a finding of
acquiescence. 330 Family members, NGOs, and even the Mexican National
Human Rights Commission have made precisely these types of allegations
against local officials in Juirez.
Whereas aiding and abetting will not reach the actions and inactions of
324. Ali v. Reno, 237 F. 3d 591 (6th Cir. 2001).
325. Id. at 598 ("[Tihis is not to say that domestic violence of the sort alleged in this case
could never be the basis for relief under the Convention against Torture. In different
circumstances, such as a situation in which the authorities ignore or consent to severe
domestic violence, the Convention appears to compel protection for a victim.").
326. See Lori Nessel, Willful Blindness to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States'
Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV.
71 (2004) (discussing In re D-K-); Center for Gender and Refugee Studies,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu (last visited Feb. 20, 2007) (searchable database of lawyer-
provided summaries of unpublished IJ opinions on gender issues including claims of rape
and domestic violence). See also Freshwater, supra note 250, at 601-02 (discussing government
acquiescence to domestic violence). Cf Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003)
("Rape can constitute torture. Rape is a form of aggression constituting an egregious violation
of humanity.") (citation omitted).
327. Nessel, supra note 326, at 74 (quotations and citation omitted).
328. Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d. 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).
329. See Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d at 1192 (finding petitioners' "evidence of
corruption in the Honduran government and underfunding of police" insufficient to sustain
CAT claim); Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 525 ("We do not believe that evidence of
widespread bribery, corruption and intimidation of government officials, or of the
government's powerlessness to prevent torture, satisfies Petitioner's burden of showing
acquiescence by the government in torture.").
330. Similar factual patterns are also considered in persecution cases where the state is
unwilling or unable to control private actions. In Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2004) members of a family of Afghani descent that had been living in Germany for many
years complained of governmental inaction to a series of threats based upon their country of
origin. In particular, they "testified that the police made no arrests," "that [school] officials ...
flatly refused to help [and] the police quickly closed their investigation." Id. See also
Freshwater, supra note 250, at 600 (noting that the two standards are "contrasted" but they
"are similar in that both are trying to determine the extent of the home government's
involvement in the applicant's situation.").
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the Mexican officials in the Judrez femicides, a state's failure to conduct an
adequate investigation or to take preventative measures can constitute
acquiescence to torture, which would be actionable under the ATS. Such a
ruling would not only break new ground in ATS jurisprudence, but also
further a gender-sensitive reading of the CAT, a reading that accounts for




My use of acquiescence to torture to determine third-party liability
under the ATS relies on the CAT definition of torture, as interpreted in U.S.
non-refoulement cases. One could object that a more relevant definition of
torture for ATS cases should be found in the TVPA. After all, courts have
looked to the TVPA in several ATS cases to answer other ancillary issues,
such as the statute of limitations, because the TVPA is the "closest
analogous federal statute" to the ATS. 
332
If courts were to rely on the TVPA's definition of torture, acquiescence
to torture would be in question because the TVPA does not explicitly refer
to acquiescence. Instead, it refers to person(s) "acting under the color of
law." 333 It could be argued that the TVPA's "color of law" language was
intended to cover acquiescence to torture because the TVPA was explicitly
designed to "carry out the intent" of the CAT. 334 Nonetheless, the Senate in
defining the scope of the TVPA - to "provide a Federal cause of action
against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under
color of law" commits torture335 - appears to rule out state acquiescence to
torture. The Senate report suggests that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 principles should
guide the interpretation of color of law, and agency theory principles
should guide the interpretation of 'under actual or apparent authority.' 3
36
Since neither set of principles encompasses acquiescence to private acts of
torture, the TVPA definition would not include acquiescence to torture.
337
This analysis hinges upon a more fundamental question: the
relationship between the ATS and the TVPA. Does the TVPA definition of
torture preempt the CAT definition? If not, then the CAT definition with its
331. See Nessel, supra note 326, at 161-62.
332. See, e.g., Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at 60-61; Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d
1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases).
333. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1).
334. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991); Alien Tort Statute Reform Act, S. 1874, 109th Cong.
(2005) (defining torture with "color of law" language).
335. S. REP. No. 102-249, supra note 334.
336. Id. at 8.
337. Id. at 14. That acquiescence would be in addition to the color of law is also clear from
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' analysis when considering ratification of the
CAT. After discussing color of law, their report continues "in addition, in our view, a public
official may be deemed to 'acquiesce' in a private act of torture." (emphasis added). (S. EXEC.
REP. No. 101-30 at 14 (1990)). See also Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under
International Law,. 67 ALB. L. REV. 427, 435 (2003) (noting that the TVPA "confines perpetrators
of torture to state actors.").
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acquiescence language could still be applied in ATS cases. Several courts
have considered this question and almost all have held that the TVPA was
intended to enhance the ATS and thus should not limit it.338 Recently, the
circuits have split on this issue. In Enahoro v. Abubakar, the Seventh Circuit
heard plaintiffs' claims under both the TVPA and the ATS and concluded
that the TVPA "does, in fact, occupy the field. If it did not, it would be
meaningless." 339 Under this reasoning, claims of torture must be made
under the TVPA and not the ATS. The court argued that Sosa's caution
against creating new private rights of action reinforces this conclusion. "It
is hard to imagine that the Sosa Court would approve of common law
claims based on torture and extrajudicial killing when Congress has
specifically provided a cause of action for those violations and . . . how
those claims must proceed." 340
The dissent in Enahoro argued that "both the plain text and the
legislative history of the TVPA indicate that it was meant to expand, not
restrict, the remedies available under the ATCA."341 Indeed, in passing the
TVPA, Congress intended to extend the ATS rights granted in Filartiga to
U.S. citizens. 342 The Enahoro dissent also points out that the Sosa Court cited
approvingly several cases that found torture actionable under the ATS:
The majority, in claiming Sosa as authority for the preclusive effect
of the TVPA, stands Sosa on its head. That case in fact relies on the
TVPA as evidence of Congressional acceptance of torture as a
norm enforceable via the ATCA. There is nothing, express or implied,
in Sosa to suggest anything about preclusion.
343
In Aldana v. Del Monte, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Enahoro dissent
that the TVPA was not meant to occupy the field and held that a plaintiff
may bring distinct claims for torture under both the TVPA and the ATS.
344
Since ATS claims have to be "committed in violation of the law of nations"
the torture definition for the ATS should be based on the customary
international law definition found in the CAT.345 The logic of the Aldana
court, coupled with many courts holding that the TVPA does not preempt
the ATS, strongly suggests that acquiescence as torture as found in the
338. E.g., Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293; Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. La. 1997) (Arguing that because the TVPA "enhances" rather than shrinks
the scope of remedies under § 1350, there is no reason to conclude that by enacting the TVPA
Congress took away causes of action for torture and extrajudicial killings under § 1350).
339. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
340. Id. at 886.
341. Id. at 886-87 (Cudahy dissenting).
342. Id. at 888 n.5 (Cudahy dissenting) ("The TVPA ... would also enhance the remedy
already available under section 1350 in an important respect: while the Alien Tort Claims act
provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens
.... Claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that
may appropriately be covered by section 1350.") (citation omitted).
343. Id. at 889.
344. Aldana v. Del Monte, 416 F.3d at 1250.
345. Id. at 1251.
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CAT can be employed in the ATS context.
Another potential objection to the acquiescence theory is that reliance
on the acquiescence language in the CAT skirts the vigilant doorkeeping of
claims actionable under the ATS that the Sosa Court recommended. Is such
an innovative application of third-party liability at odds with the caution of
Sosa? To counter this objection, one must recall the context of Sosa's
caution: the development of new private rights of action, especially in
foreign affairs. The use of acquiescence to torture does not create a new
right of action because the prohibition against torture itself is clearly part of
the law of nations and of U.S. law. And since Filartiga, with the exception of
Enahoro, courts have recognized torture as actionable under the ATS. The
Sosa Court was clear that Congressional intent should be an important
consideration when innovating in areas related to foreign relations: "[T]he
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law [in the area of foreign relations].
It would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a
jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two
centuries." 346 However, Congressional intent is quite clear in this area in
two respects. First, the Senate in its report on the TVPA made it clear that it
was codifying and expanding the Filartiga decision.347 Second, Congress
clearly stated its concern about the femicides in Judrez with the passage of
a resolution in May 2006.348 Therefore, the proposal to use acquiescence to
torture, especially in the context of an ATS case on the femicides, would be
consistent with Congressional intent and would not be a new cause of
action.
CONCLUSION:
THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Since 1993, hundreds of women in Ciudad Judrez have been brutally
murdered and many have been raped and subjected to other types of
torture. Although it is still not clear who is perpetrating many of these
crimes, the Mexican authorities have not taken sufficient steps to
investigate and prevent them. This Article examined two major types of
third-party liability under the ATS in the context of these femicides. Several
high profile cases and a proposed Senate bill have challenged whether
aiding and abetting liability exists under the ATS. I agree with many
scholars and most courts that aiding and abetting liability should remain
intact under the ATS. However, the theories of aiding and abetting
346. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (Scalia concurring) (citing the majority
opinion approvingly).
347. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5.
348. H.R. Con. Res. 90, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted) (Inter alia, condemning the femicides,
expressing support for the victims' families, condemning torture in the investigation of the
femicides). In its Resolution, Congress encouraged the Secretary of State "to urge the State of
Chihuahua to hold accountable those law enforcement officials whose failure to adequately
investigate the murders, whether through negligence, omission, or abuse, has led to impunity
for these crimes." Id. at 3.
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proposed by the courts and scholars would most likely not reach the
actions and inactions of the Mexican authorities. Instead, I offer
acquiescence to torture as an alternative form of third party liability. As
primary liability for secondary actors, acquiescence to torture would most
likely survive even a challenge to aiding and abetting and other forms of
secondary liability. Moreover, as interpreted through the FARRA and
subsequent non-refoulement case law, acquiescence to torture extends to
government officials' failure to prevent and/or investigate private acts of
torture. It could thus reach Mexican government officials in Judrez case,
because they have been willfully blind to private acts of torture.
Though Sosa stands for vigilant doorkeeping of permissible claims
under the ATS, it has also established a framework for the progressive
development of ATS jurisprudence. As international human rights norms
become universal, specific, and obligatory, they should become actionable
under the ATS.349 Such a progressive development of human rights law is
crucial because legal institutions and instruments need to be constantly
interrogated to determine if they marginalize those that they should
protect.350 For the CAT to meet its stated objective "to make more effective
the struggle against torture,"351 courts should increasingly hold state actors
accountable for the actions of non-state actors under theories of aiding and
abetting and acquiescence. Anything less would authorize the most
prevalent types of torture.352 State responsibility for the actions of non-state
actors is especially important in the context of gender violence. The CAT
was drafted in an era not especially sensitive to the gender aspect of torture
and thus did not "take into account the different ways in which women
experience torture." 353 The sexual homicides, brutal torture, and extreme
forms of domestic violence prevalent in Julrez may not be the type of
torture that the drafters of the CAT envisioned, but they represent types of
actions that are increasingly recognized as torture. 354 Courts need to
349. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730 ("It would take some explaining to say now that federal
courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect
individuals.").
350. See generally Schmidt Camacho, supra note 58, at 281-83.
351. CAT, supra note 12, pmbl.
352. Miller, supra note 257, at 310 ("[in the modern world, torturers are less often
organized states and more often non-state, or quasi-governmental bodies."). See also Jennifer
Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by
Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 81, 94 (1999) ("It is the erroneous conceptual
leap from states as essential vehicles for protection, to states as exclusive sources of abuse, that
has the dangerous capacity to create a class of individuals who are cut off from international
protection: victims of non-state agents of repression.").
353. Nessel, supra note 326, at 80.
354. See, e.g., World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), Interpretation of the Definition of
Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the Light of European and
International Case Law, October 30, 2004 at 35 ("The State's unwillingness to take all possible
measures to prevent domestic violence and to protect women from such violence suggests
official consent or acquiescence to torture under Article 1 of the convention.") (internal
citation omitted); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence
as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 356 (1994) ("Where domestic violence is a matter
of common knowledge and law enforcement and affirmative prevention measures are
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increasingly interpret the CAT from a gendered perspective, and a liberal
interpretation of "acquiescence" is crucial for such progressive
development.
355
inadequate, or where complaints are made and not properly responded to, the state should be
held to have "acquiesced" in the continued infliction of violence.").
355. See Nessel, supra note 326, at 144 ("[A] restrictive interpretation of acquiescence'
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